TREĆE ODELJENjE

PREDMET ĐAKOVIĆ protiv SRBIJE
(Predstavka broj 30749/22)

PRESUDA

STRAZBUR
17. februar 2026. godine

Ova presuda će postati pravnosnažna u okolnostima utvrđenim u članu 44. stav 2. Konvencije. Ona može biti predmet redakcijskih izmena.

U predmetu Đaković protiv Srbije,

Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Treće odeljenje), na zasedanju Veća u sastavu:

Ioannis Ktistakis, predsednik,

Peeter Roosma,

Lətif Hüseynov,

Diana Kovatcheva,

Mateja Đurović,

Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,

Vasilka Sancin, sudije,

i Milan Blaško, sekretar Odeljenja,

Imajući u vidu:

predstavku protiv Republike Srbije (broj 30749/22) podnetu Sudu prema članu 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: „Konvencija”) od strane hrvatskog državljanina, gospodina Vilka Đakovića (u daljem tekstu: „podnosilac”), dana 17. juna 2022. godine;

odluku da se Vlada Republike Srbije (u daljem tekstu: „Vlada”) obavesti o pritužbi po članu 2. u vezi sa nedostatkom delotvorne istrage povodom smrti oca podnosioca, i da se ostatak predstavke proglasi nedopuštenim;

Zapažanja strana u sporu;

komentare koje je podnela Vlada Republike Hrvatske, koja je iskoristila svoje pravo na intervenciju u skladu sa članom 36. stav 1. Konvencije;

Nakon većanja na zatvorenoj sednici održanoj 20. januara 2026. godine,

Donosi sledeću presudu, koja je usvojena tog dana:

UVOD

1. Predmet se odnosi na pritužbu podnosioca po članu 2. Konvencije da srpske vlasti nisu sprovele delotvornu zvaničnu istragu povodom smrti njegovog oca, P.Đ.

ČINjENICE

2. Podnosilac je rođen 1957. godine i živi u Lovasu, Republika Hrvatska. Njega je zastupao gospodin M. Pavlović, advokat iz Beograda.

3. Vladu je zastupala gospođa Z. Jadrijević Mladar, njena zastupnica.

4. Činjenice predmeta se mogu sumirati na sledeći način.

I. UBISTVO OCA PODNOSIOCA PREDSTAVKE

5. Predmetni incident se dogodio u hrvatskom selu Lovas tokom oružanog sukoba koji je trajao od 1991. do 1995. godine, a koji se dogodio u kontekstu rata koji je usledio nakon raspada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije.

6. Dana 10. oktobra 1991. godine, Jugoslovenska narodna armija, zajedno sa određenim brojem lokalno regrutovanih snaga „teritorijalne odbrane”, lokalne policije i dobrovoljačkih snaga, granatirala je, a potom i zauzela selo Lovas, u kome je živeo P.Đ. P.Đ. je prilikom tog napada upucan i ubijen.

II. PRVI SKUP KRIVIČNIH POSTUPAKA (K.PO2 1/2014)

7. Tužilac za ratne zločine Republike Srbije je dana 28. novembra 2007. godine podigao optužnicu protiv 14 lica za ratne zločine protiv civilnog stanovništva po članu 142. Krivičnog zakona Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Navedena optužnica se odnosila na razne zločine počinjene tokom meseca oktobra 1991. godine tokom i nakon zauzimanja Lovasa. Četvorica optuženih su optuženi, između ostalog, za ubistvo P.Đ., dok je preostalih 10 lica optuženo za razne zločine počinjene nakon zauzimanja sela.

8. Optužnica je izmenjena 28. decembra 2011. godine. Optužbe protiv tri od četiri lica, prvobitno optuženih za ubistvo P.Đ., odbačene su u vezi sa tim konkretnim krivičnim delom, ali su i dalje bili optuženi za druga krivična dela. Samo je Ž.K., koji je u relevantno vreme obavljao funkciju komandanta lokalne policijske stanice, ostao optužen za ubistvo P.Đ. On je bio optužen zbog uloge u organizovanju i učešću u napadu na selo Lovas i njegovo civilno stanovništvo dana 10. oktobra 1991. godine u jutarnjim časovima. Postojali su navodi da je postupao po naređenju komandanta Jugoslovenske narodne armije kada je rukovodio napadom na civilno stanovništvo sela Lovas. Prema optužnici, napad je izvršila naoružana grupa koju su činili dobrovoljci, pripadnici lokalne policijske stanice i lokalne snage „teritorijalne odbrane”. Bez konkretnih ciljeva i u odsustvu bilo kakve vojne potrebe, grupa je neselektivno otvarala vatru iz pušaka, bacala granate u dvorišta, kuće, podrume i druge prostorije, ubijala civile na tim lokacijama i nasilno izvodila ostala lica iz njihovih domova nakon čega bi izvršavala njihovo pogubljenje na ulicama i drugde. Ti zločini su prouzrokovali rasprostranjeno uništenje stambenih i drugih civilnih objekata i rezultirali smrću sedam osoba, uključujući P.Đ. Preostalih 13 optuženih je optuženo u vezi sa krivičnim delima počinjenim nakon tog datuma i nakon ubistva oca podnosioca.

9. U neodređenom trenutku tokom prvostepenog postupka, postupajući zamenik tužioca za ratne zločine je u službenoj belešci zabeležio da su određene radnje i propusti D.L. – komandanta Jugoslovenske narodne armije za koga se tvrdi da je naredio napad na selo, a koji nije bio među optuženima – izazvali ozbiljnu zabrinutost u vezi sa njegovom krivičnom odgovornošću. Međutim, smatralo se da bi to pitanje trebalo rešiti nakon završetka postupka protiv neposrednih počinilaca, što je bio stav koji je podržao i tadašnji tužilac za ratne zločine.

10. Viši sud u Beogradu je 20. juna 2019. godine doneo osuđujuću presudu protiv osam osoba za ratne zločine počinjene protiv civilnog stanovništva u oktobru 1991. godine. Sedam osuđujućih presuda odnosilo se na događaje koji nisu povezani sa ubistvom oca podnosioca. Ž.K. je proglašen krivim u vezi sa događajima od 10. oktobra 1991. godine. Sud je utvrdio da je dotični postupao po naređenju D.L. prilikom rukovođenja napadom na selo Lovas, tokom kojeg je ubijeno sedam civila, uključujući P.Đ.

11. Apelacioni sud u Beogradu je 20. novembra 2020. godine preinačio prvostepenu presudu, umanjivši kazne u pogledu šestorice optuženih i u pogledu Ž.K. i još jednog optuženog, oslobodivšši ih krivice.

III. KRIVIČNA PRIJAVA PODNOSIOCA PREDSTAVKE

12. Dana 2. novembra 2016. godine, Fond za humanitarno pravo (u daljem tekstu: „FHP”) je podneo krivičnu prijavu u ime podnosioca Tužilaštvu za ratne zločine Republike Srbije protiv D.L. zbog ratnih zločina protiv civilnog stanovništva iz člana 142. Krivičnog zakona Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. U prijavi se navodi da je D.L. naredio napad na selo Lovas dana 9. oktobra 1991. godine i naložio uključivanje pomoćnih snaga u operacije usmerene i na naoružana i na civilna lica koja su smatrana neprijateljski nastrojenim. Dalje se navodi da je dotični naredio artiljerijski napad 10. oktobra 1991. godine, nakon čega su usledili kopneni napadi izvršeni pod njegovom komandom. U tim napadima je poginulo 21 civilno lice, uključujući P. Đ. FHP je naveo da je osnovana sumnja da je D.L. počinio navedena dela proistekla, između ostalog, iz svedočenja i drugih dokaza sadržanih u spisima predmeta K.Po2 1/2014 (videti st. 7–11 gore).

13. Dana 20. decembra 2016. godine, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije obavestilo je FHP da je predistražni postupak u toku i da se navodi iz krivične prijave ispituju.

14. U periodu između 2. februara 2017. i 25. oktobra 2018. godine, FHP je podneo pet pisanih urgencija Tužilaštvu za ratne zločine Republike Srbije, zahtevajući napredak u vezi sa krivičnom prijavom i tražeći informacije o statusu istrage.

15. Dana 1. marta 2017. godine, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije obavestilo je FHP da je u postupku prikupljanja informacija od nadležnih državnih organa i da će odluka o daljim procesnim koracima biti doneta nakon završetka tog postupka.

16. Dana 25. oktobra 2018. godine, FHP je podneo formalni prigovor na postupanje Tužilaštva za ratne zločine Republike Srbije, tvrdeći da je njegova istraga nedelotvorna i zahtevajući ubrzanje postupka.

17. Dana 5. novembra 2018. godine, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije odbacilo je ovaj prigovor kao neosnovan.

18. Dana 8. novembra 2018. godine, FHP je podneo još jedan prigovor Republičkom javnom tužilaštvu u vezi sa postupanjem Tužilaštva za ratne zločine, ponavljajući svoju tvrdnju da je istraga po krivičnoj prijavi bila nedelotvorna.

19. Dana 22. novembra 2018. godine, Republičko javno tužilaštvo je odbacilo ovaj prigovor kao neosnovan.

IV. POSTUPAK PRED USTAVNIM SUDOM

20. Dana 3. decembra 2018. godine, podnosilac je podneo ustavnu žalbu, navodeći, između ostalog, povredu njegovog prava na delotvornu istragu koje se jemči članom 2. Konvencije. Podnosilac se prituživao da, nakon dve godine od podnošenja krivične prijave, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine nije preduzelo bilo kakve mere u predistražnom postupku, jer nijedan oštećeni ili osumnjičeni nije saslušan, nisu prikupljeni bilo kakvi dokazi, niti je izdata naredba o pokretanju istrage. Podnosilac je izjavio da slučaj nije složen, da uključuje samo jednog optuženog i da su dokazi već dostupni u drugom postupku za ratne zločine koji se trenutno vodi (K.Po2 1/2014, videti st. 7–11 gore). Dalje je tvrdio da Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine nije odgovorilo na njegove zahteve za pružanje informacija. Pozivajući se na sudsku praksu Suda, podnosilac je tvrdio da takva dugotrajna neaktivnost nije ispunila zahtev delotvorne istrage kako je to priznato od strane Ustavnog suda i prema Konvenciji.

21. Ustavni sud je dana 30. marta 2022. godine odbacio ustavnu žalbu podnosioca. U svom obrazloženju, Ustavni sud se pozvao na odgovor Tužilaštva za ratne zločine na navode podnosioca o neaktivnosti, napominjući da je zamenik tužioca za ratne zločine odmah po prijemu krivične prijave prikupio izjave od D.L. i od nekoliko vojnih oficira u penziji, dok su neki predloženi svedoci u međuvremenu preminuli. Tužilac je takođe pregledao spise predmeta K.Po2 1/2014, koji se odnosio na iste krivične događaje u selu Lovas (videti st. 7–11 gore), a pregledao je i spise predmeta TRZ Ktr 45/14, oformljenog po krivičnoj prijavi jednog od optuženih u predmetu K. Po2 1/2014, protiv D.L. Ti spisi su sadržali službenu belešku postupajućeg zamenika tužioca za ratne zločine u kojoj se navodi da određene radnje i propusti D.L. zahtevaju ozbiljno razmatranje njegove krivične odgovornosti, ali da bi bilo prikladno da se to proceni nakon završetka glavnog predmeta Lovas (K.Po2 1/2014) protiv neposrednih počinilaca, što je bio stav koji je odobrio tadašnji tužilac za ratne zločine. Ustavni sud je utvrdio da je, nakon prijema krivične prijave podnosioca od 2. novembra 2016. godine, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine sprovelo predistražni postupak i da je 5. februara 2021. godine formalno otvorilo istragu protiv D.L. za ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva u vezi sa događajima koji su, između ostalog, uključivali ubistvo P.Đ. Stoga je utvrdio da je žalba podnosioca u vezi sa nedostatkom delotvorne istrage neosnovana. Ta odluka je uručena pravnom zastupniku podnosioca 2. juna 2022. godine.

V. DRUGI SKUP KRIVIČNIH POSTUPAKA

22. Dana 12. septembra 2022. godine, Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine je podiglo optužnicu protiv D.L. za ratne zločine protiv civilnog stanovništva prema članu 142. Krivičnog zakona Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, u vezi sa događajima u selu Lovas 9. i 10. oktobra 1991. godine. Optužnica se, između ostalog, odnosila na ubistvo 21 civila, među kojima je bio i P.Đ. Suđenje je otpočelo 14. decembra 2022. godine. Krivični postupak je trenutno u toku u prvom stepenu pred Višim sudom u Beogradu, sa 19 zakazanih ročišta, od kojih je 14 održano, dok je pet odloženo do 20. januara 2026. godine.

23. Podnosilac predstavke je pozvan da dȃ iskaz kao svedok u tom krivičnom postupku u dva navrata, u aprilu i julu 2024. godine, putem zahteva dostavljenih hrvatskim vlastima. Prvi put, Ministarstvo pravde Republike Hrvatske je naznačilo da nije u mogućnosti da organizuje davanje iskaza putem video-linka. Drugi put, podnosilac je odbio da svedoči usled bolesti.

RELEVANTNI PRAVNI OKVIR

KRIVIČNI ZAKON SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE

24. Krivični zakon Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (objavljen u „Službenom listu SFRJ”, broj 44/76, sa izmenama i dopunama objavljenim u „Službenom listu SFRJ”, br. 36/77, 34/84, 37/84, 74/87, 57/89, 3/90, 38/90, 45/90 i 54/90, i „Službenom listu SRJ”, br. 35/92, 16/93, 31/93, 37/93 i 24/94) je bio na snazi u relevantno vreme. Relevantne odredbe navedenog zakona glase:

Član 142. – Ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva

„Ko kršeći pravila međunarodnog prava za vreme rata, oružanog sukoba ili okupacije naredi da se prema civilnom stanovništvu vrše ubistva, mučenja, nečovečna postupanja, biološki eksperimenti, nanošenje velikih patnji ili povreda telesnog integriteta ili zdravlja; raseljavanje ili preseljavanje ili prisilno odnarodnjavanje ili prevođenje na drugu veru; prisiljavanje na prostituciju ili silovanja; primenjivanje mera zastrašivanja i terora, uzimanje talaca, kolektivno kažnjavanje, protivzakonito odvođenje u koncentracione logore i druga protivzakonita zatvaranja, lišavanje prava na pravilno i nepristrasno suđenje; prisiljavanje na službu u oružanim snagama neprijateljske sile ili u njenoj obaveštajnoj službi ili administraciji; prisiljavanje na prinudni rad, izgladnjavanje stanovništva, konfiskovanje imovine, pljačkanje imovine stanovništva, protivzakonito i samovoljno uništavanje ili prisvajanje u velikim razmerama imovine koje nije opravdano vojnim potrebama, uzimanje nezakonite i nesrazmerno velike kontribucije i rekvizicije, smanjenje vrednosti domaćeg novca ili protivzakonito izdavanje novca, ili ko izvrši neko od navedenih dela, kazniće se zatvorom od najmanje pet godina ili smrtnom kaznom.”

PRAVO

I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 2. KONVENCIJE

25. Podnosilac se prituživao da srpske vlasti nisu sprovele delotvornu istragu povodom ubistva njegovog oca. On se pozvao na član 2. Konvencije, čiji relevantni deo glasi:

„1. Pravo na život svakog lica zaštićeno je zakonom.”

A. Dopuštenost

1. Prigovor Vlade zbog zloupotrebe prava na pojedinačnu predstavku

(a) Podnesci strana u sporu

26. Vlada je tvrdila da podnosilac nije obavestio Sud da je, nakon podnošenja njegove predstavke, Tužilac za ratne zločine Republike Srbije podigao optužnicu protiv D.L. za ratne zločine, uključujući ubistvo oca podnosioca. Taj postupak je trenutno u toku u prvom stepenu pred Višim sudom u Beogradu (videti st. 22–23. gore). Prema mišljenju Vlade, taj propust nije bio nenameran, već je predstavljao „namerno propuštanje da se Sudu dostave sve relevantne informacije u vezi sa slučajem podnosioca”. Podnosilac je takođe propustio da obavesti Sud o svom odbijanju da svedoči u krivičnom postupku (videti stav 23. gore). Da je obavestio Sud o tim činjenicama, njegova predstavka „verovatno ne bi bila prosleđena Tuženoj”. Podnosilac je tako pokušao da prikrije prave činjenice u vezi sa napretkom istrage i sopstvenim doprinosom kašnjenjima u krivičnom postupku. Shodno tome, on je zloupotrebio svoje pravo na pojedinačnu predstavku, u smislu člana 35. stav 3(a) Konvencije.

27. Podnosilac se nije složio sa tim navodima. On je naveo da je njegov pravni zastupnik prekinuo saradnju sa FHP-om u julu 2023. godine, te da stoga nije bio upoznat sa bilo kakvim naknadnim dešavanjima u pogledu krivičnog postupka, što čini tvrdnju Vlade o namernom neotkrivanju neosnovanom. On je tvrdio da je bio sprečen da svedoči usled lošeg zdravstvenog stanja, a ne zbog odsustva volje. Dalje je naglasio da njegovo svedočenje nije od odlučujućeg značaja za nastavak postupka, jer nije bio neposredni svedok predmetnih događaja. Njegovo učešće nije bilo ni neophodno za vođenje niti odlučujuće za ishod krivičnog postupka. On je tvrdio da je odbijanje domaćeg suda da ispita druge raspoložive dokaze, uz pripisivanje procesnih kašnjenja njemu, samo dalje potvrdilo njegov argument da srpskim pravosudnim organima nedostaje volja da okončaju postupak.

(b) Ocena Suda

(i) Relevantna načela

28. Sud ponavlja da se predstavka može odbaciti zbog zloupotrebe prava na predstavku prema članu 35. stav 3(a) Konvencije ukoliko je, između ostalog, bila svesno zasnovana na neistinitim činjenicama i lažnim izjavama (videti, na primer, Minić protiv Srbije (odluka), broj 18415/20, stav 29, od 22. oktobra 2024. godine, i izvore navedene u njoj).

29. Dostavljanje nepotpunih i samim tim obmanjujućih informacija takođe može predstavljati zloupotrebu prava na predstavku, posebno ukoliko se informacije odnose na sȃmu suštinu slučaja i ukoliko nije dato dovoljno objašnjenje za neotkrivanje takvih informacija (ibid., stav 30.). Isto važi ukoliko je tokom postupka pred Sudom došlo do važnih novih događaja i ako, uprkos tome što se to izričito zahteva pravilom 47. stav 7. Poslovnika Suda, podnosilac predstavke propusti da otkrije tu informaciju Sudu, čime sprečava Sud da donese odluku u predmetu uz puno poznavanje činjenica. Međutim, čak i u takvim slučajevima, nameran pokušaj podnosioca predstavke da obmane Sud mora uvek biti utvrđen sa dovoljnom izvesnošću (videti Gross protiv Švajcarske [VV], broj 67810/10, stav 28, ESLJP 2014, sa daljim referencama).

(ii) Primena ovih načela na predmetni slučaj

30. Sud primećuje da je 12. septembra 2022. godine, manje od tri meseca nakon podnošenja predmetne predstavke, Tužilac za ratne zločine Republike Srbije pokrenuo drugi set krivičnih postupaka u vezi sa ratnim zločinima, uključujući ubistvo P.Đ. (videti stav 22. gore). On dalje konstatuje da podnosilac nije obavestio Sud o početku ili naknadnom toku tog postupka. Sud ne smatra ubedljivim objašnjenje podnosioca da nije bio upoznat sa bilo kakvim razvojem događaja u domaćoj istrazi u periodu između 12. septembra 2022. i 25. septembra 2024. godine, kada je tužena Vlada obaveštena o podnošenju predstavke. Sud posebno konstatuje da je podnosilac sȃm bio pozvan u dva navrata tokom 2024. godine da svedoči u tom postupku. Ipak, Sud smatra da se pritužba podnosioca odnosi na sveopštu delotvornost tekućeg istražnog postupka. U tom kontekstu, pokretanje drugog seta krivičnog postupka je činilo deo šireg istražnog okvira, koji je obuhvatao ne samo postupak protiv direktnih počinilaca, već i ispitivanje odgovornosti D.L. u svojstvu komandanta (videti Jelić protiv Hrvatske, broj 57856/11, st. 88, 90, 94; od 12. juna 2014. godine, Borojević i dr. protiv Hrvatske, broj 70273/11, stav 63, od 4. aprila 2017. godine; i, mutatis mutandis, Lutsenko i Verbytskyy protiv Ukrajine, br. 12482/14 i 39800/14, stav 68, od 21. januara 2021. godine). Iako je pokretanje tih postupaka bilo očigledno relevantno i iako je Sudu bilo potrebno skrenuti pažnju na iste, to nije promenilo suštinu pritužbe podnosioca, koja se odnosi na navodnu nedelotvornost istrage u celini, a posebno na činjenicu da je, više od 34 godine nakon ubistva njegovog oca, krivična istraga o tom ubistvu još uvek u toku. Sud stoga zaključuje da, iako je podnosilac trebalo da mu skrene pažnju na relevantne informacije, nema naznaka da je nameravao da obmane Sud u vezi sa bilo kojim pitanjem ključnim za predmetni slučaj, ili da je njegova predstavka svesno zasnovana na lažnim informacijama (videti sudsku praksu navedenu u st. 28-29 gore).

31. Kada je u pitanju argument Vlade u vezi sa navodnim odbijanjem podnosioca da svedoči u domaćem postupku, to ponašanje se dogodilo u okviru domaćeg postupka, a ne u njegovim odnosima sa Sudom. Iz toga sledi da podnesci Vlade u ovom pogledu nisu relevantni za procenu bilo kakve navodne zloupotrebe prava na pojedinačnu predstavku (videti, mutatis mutandis, Paun Jovanović protiv Srbije, broj 41394/15, stav 50, od 7. februara 2023. godine).

32. S obzirom na gore navedeno, Sud je mišljenja da ponašanje podnosioca nije predstavljalo zloupotrebu prava na pojedinačnu predstavku u smislu člana 35. stav 3(a) Konvencije.

2. Nadležnost ratione temporis

33. Sud primećuje da Vlada nije uložila prigovor u pogledu nedopuštenosti predstavke usled nedostatka nadležnosti ratione temporis. Međutim, pošto ovo pitanje spada u nadležnost Suda, istom nije zabranjeno da ga razmotri proprio motu (videti Petrović protiv Srbije, broj 40485/08, stav 66, od 15. jula 2014. godine).

34. Relevantna načela koja se tiču nadležnosti Suda ratione temporis da rešava u meritumu pritužbe podnosioca predstavke u skladu sa procesnim aspektom člana 2. Konvencije navedeni su u predmetu Janowiec i dr. protiv Rusije ([VV], br. 55508/07 i 29520/09, st. 140–51, ESLJP 2013).

35. Konkretno, vremenska nadležnost Suda u vezi sa procesnim obavezama istrage po članu 2. Konvencije strogo je ograničena na procesne radnje koje su sprovedene ili je trebalo da budu sprovedene u periodu nakon stupanja na snagu Konvencije u odnosu na tuženu Državu („kritični datum”), i podleže postojanju suštinske veze između događaja koji je doveo do gore pomenute procesne obaveze po članu 2. i kritičnog datuma (ibid., st. 142. i 145.). Takva veza je prvenstveno definisana vremenskom blizinom između događaja koji je sve prouzrokovao i kritičnog datuma, koji moraju biti razdvojeni samo razumno kratkim protokom vremena koji obično ne bi trebalo da bude duži od 10 godina (ibid., stav 146.), i biće uspostavljena samo ukoliko je veliki deo istrage obavljen ili je trebalo da bude obavljen u periodu nakon stupanja Konvencije na snagu (ibid., stav 147.).

36. Sud je, međutim, prihvatio da mogu postojati vanredne situacije koje ne zadovoljavaju standard „suštinske veze”, kako je gore opisano, ali gde bi potreba da se obezbedi stvarna i delotvorna zaštita za garancije i temeljne vrednosti Konvencije predstavljala dovoljan osnov da se prihvati da veza postoji (ibid., stav 149.). Sud smatra da upućivanje na temeljne vrednosti Konvencije znači da se može ustanoviti da postoji zahtevana veza ukoliko je događaj koji je sve pokrenuo bio većih razmera nego obično krivično delo i ako je predstavljao negiranje samih temelja Konvencije. To bi bio slučaj s ozbiljnim zločinima prema međunarodnom pravu, kao što su ratni zločini, genocid ili zločini protiv čovečnosti, u skladu sa definicijama ovih dela u relevantnim međunarodnim instrumentima (ibid., stav 150.).

37. Vraćajući se na predmetni slučaj, Sud konstatuje da se pritužba u vezi sa procesnim aspektom člana 2. Konvencije odnosi na istragu događaja koji se dogodio u oktobru 1991. godine. Potrebno je napomenuti da je prošlo više od 12 godina i četiri meseca između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i stupanja Konvencije na snagu u odnosu na Srbiju 3. marta 2004. godine.

38. Pre tog datuma, čini se da nisu preduzeti nikakvi procesni koraci u kontekstu istrage. Tek nakon stupanja Konvencije na snagu, preduzete su istražne mere, posebno od 2007. godine pa nadalje, koje su obuhvatale dva skupa krivičnih postupaka za ratne zločine protiv civilnog stanovništva, što je uključivalo i ubistvo oca podnosioca. Drugim rečima, istraga je u celosti sprovedena nakon kritičnog datuma, zajedno sa svim relevantnim procesnim radnjama. Štaviše, iako je period između događaja koji je sve pokrenuo i kritičnog datuma premašio 10 godina, incident je istražen i procesuiran pred domaćim sudovima kao ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva. Ta klasifikacija ukazuje na to da je događaj tretiran kao krivično delo čija je težina veća od običnog krivičnog dela. S obzirom na gore navedeno, Sud smatra da slučaj ispunjava zahteve testa „vrednosti Konvencije” (videti Krdžalija i dr. protiv Crne Gore (odluka), broj 79065/13, st. 123–128, od 14. marta 2023. godine).

39. Shodno tome, Sud nalazi da ima nadležnost ratione temporis da ispita predstavku prema članu 2. Konvencije, u njegovom procesnom aspektu, u vezi sa istragom ubistva P.Đ.

40. Sud konstatuje da predmetna predstavka nije ni očigledno neosnovana niti nedopuštena po bilo kom drugom osnovu navedenom u članu 35. Konvencije. Prema tome, ona se mora proglasiti dopuštenom.

B. Osnovanost

1. Podnesci strana u sporu

(a) Podnosilac predstavke

41. Podnosilac je tvrdio da je istraga o smrti njegovog oca bila nedelotvorna. On je tvrdio da je Tužilac za ratne zločine Republike Srbije namerno odlagao napredak u slučaju koji, po njegovom mišljenju, nije bio ni činjenično ni pravno složen. Po njegovom mišljenju, takvo ponašanje je izazvalo ozbiljne sumnje u pogledu nezavisnosti istrage, i ukazivalo je na namerni pokušaj izbegavanja krivičnog gonjenja odgovornih. On je posebno naglasio vremenski period od skoro šest godina između podnošenja krivične prijave 2. novembra 2016. godine (videti stav 12. gore) i podizanja optužnice 12. septembra 2022. godine (videti stav 22. gore). Dalje je napomenuo da je većina relevantnih činjenica u vezi sa smrću njegovog oca već utvrđena u prvom skupu krivičnog postupka (videti st. 7–11. gore), i da se drugi skup krivičnog postupka koji je trenutno u toku odnosi samo na jednog optuženog, što ne opravdava njegovu dugotrajnost.

(b) Tužena Vlada

42. Vlada je iznela svoje mišljenje da nije došlo do povrede procesnog aspekta člana 2. Konvencije. Istragu o ubistvu oca podnosioca sproveo je nezavisni organ, naime Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije, i ona je bila adekvatna i delotvorna. Istraga, pokrenuta nakon krivične prijave koju je podneo FHP 2. novembra 2016. godine, okončana je podizanjem optužnice protiv D.L. za ratni zločin, dok je krivični postupak trenutno u toku. Iako je Vlada priznala da je skoro šest godina proteklo od podnošenja krivične prijave od strane podnosioca do podizanja optužnice, ona je tvrdila da je istraga bila brza, posebno kada se posmatra u kontekstu inherentne složenosti slučajeva ratnih zločina. Takvi slučajevi često uključuju brojne pojedince iz različitih zemalja, značajne vremenske razmake i složene dokaze. Postupci, uključujući i one koji proizilaze iz pritužbe podnosioca, obično dovode do više povezanih slučajeva. Shodno tome, standard ažurnosti koji se primenjuje na redovne krivične postupke nije mogao automatski biti primenjen na tako složena pitanja. Vlada je posebno naglasila činjenicu da je širi krivični postupak u vezi sa događajima u selu Lovas, u koji je umešana veća grupa osumnjičenih, pokrenut još 2007. godine, znatno pre nego što je podneta krivična prijava od strane podnosioca. Tokom tog postupka, već je utvrđeno da je D.L. naredio napad na civilno stanovništvo sela Lovas, nakon čega je izdata naredba o sprovođenju istrage protiv njega (videti st. 7–11. gore). Vlada je naglasila da u okolnostima kao što su one u predmetnom slučaju, gde su smrtni slučajevi nastupili usred opšteg nasilja, oružanog sukoba ili pobune, istražitelji mogu naići na značajne prepreke i praktična ograničenja, što bi moglo zahtevati usvajanje manje delotvornih mera ili dovesti do kašnjenja. Ona je tvrdila da su preduzeti svi razumni koraci za sprovođenje delotvorne i nezavisne istrage, čak i u teškim bezbednosnim uslovima. Na kraju, procesna prava podnosioca su poštovana, uključujući njegovo učešće kao najbližeg srodnika, putem poziva za svedočenje, koji je on odbio. Takav „stav” podnosioca onemogućio je okončanje predmetnog krivičnog postupka.

(c) Vlada Hrvatske

43. Vlada Hrvatske podržala je stav podnosioca i tvrdila da je došlo do povrede člana 2. Konvencije u njegovom procesnom delu. Ona je dalje tvrdila da nedelotvorna istraga u predmetnom slučaju odražava širu situaciju u Srbiji u kojoj je postojao zabrinjavajući nedostatak istrage ratnih zločina.

2. Ocena Suda

44. Sud se poziva na opšta načela u vezi sa procesnom obavezom sprovođenja delotvorne istrage prema članu 2, kako je sumirano u predmetu Gruzija protiv Rusije (II) ([VV], broj 38263/08, stav 326, od 21. januara 2021. godine).

45. Sud na samom početku ponavlja da nema mnogo osnova za preterano propisivanje u pogledu mogućnosti obaveze istrage nezakonitih ubistava mnogo godina nakon takvih događaja, budući da je javni interes za iniciranje krivičnog gonjenja i osude počinilaca dobro prepoznat, posebno u kontekstu ratnih zločina i zločina protiv čovečnosti (Brecknell protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, broj 32457/04, stav 69, od 27. novembra 2007. godine). Pitanje kojim oblikom će istraga postići cilj člana 2. može varirati u zavisnosti od okolnosti slučaja. Međutim, bez obzira na korišćenu metodu, vlasti su dužne da deluju po sopstvenoj inicijativi čim im predmet bude predočen. One ne mogu prepustiti najbližim srodnicima inicijativu da podnesu formalne krivične prijave niti da preuzmu odgovornost za pokretanje bilo kakvih istražnih postupaka (videti Al-Skeini i dr. protiv Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva [VV], broj 55721/07, stav 165, ESLJP 2011). Štaviše, ukoliko istraga dovede do pokretanja postupka pred domaćim sudovima, onda ceo postupak, uključujući i fazu suđenja, mora da ispunjava zahteve člana 2. (videti Öneryıldız protiv Turske [VV], broj 48939/99, stav 95, ESLJP 2004-XII, i Ali i Ayşe Duran protiv Turske, broj 42942/02, stav 61, od 8. aprila 2008. godine). Sud dalje ističe zahtev ažurnosti i razumne brzine postupanja, što se podrazumeva u kontekstu delotvornosti domaćih postupaka pokrenutih radi rasvetljavanja okolnosti smrti pojedinca (videti Jelić, citiran gore, stav 91.).

46. Kao preliminarno zapažanje, Sud konstatuje da se podnosilac i u svojoj ustavnoj žalbi, i u svojoj predstavci pred Sudom, prituživao na nedelotvornu istragu o smrti njegovog oca, fokusirajući se prvenstveno na navod da, nakon podnošenja krivične prijave Tužilaštvu za ratne zločine 2016. godine (videti st. 12–19. gore), Tužilac za ratne zločine nije reagovao ažurno niti efikasno. Iako se pritužba podnosioca odnosila na postupanje po njegovoj krivičnoj prijavi, on se takođe pozivao na činjenicu da je prvi skup krivičnog postupka pokrenut 2007. godine (videti stav 41. gore), i na istu se pozivao u svojoj krivičnoj prijavi (videti stav 12. gore) i u svojoj ustavnoj žalbi (videti stav 20. gore). Štaviše, činjenicu da je smrt oca podnosioca već bila predmet krivičnog postupka eksplicitno je naveo Ustavni sud prilikom odbacivanja ustavne žalbe podnosioca (videti stav 21. gore), kao i Vlada u svojim zapažanjima pred Sudom (videti stav 42. gore). Shodno tome, prilikom procene delotvornosti istrage pokrenute krivičnom prijavom podnosioca, Sud, koji je vezan obimom predmeta na koji „je upućen“ vršenjem prava na pojedinačnu predstavku onako kako je utvrđeno pritužbom podnosioca (videti Radomilja i dr. protiv Hrvatske [VV], br. 37685/10 i 22768/12, stav 109, od 20. marta 2018. godine), takođe mora uzeti u obzir činjenicu da je krivični postupak bio u toku od 2007. godine, pre podnošenja prijave od strane podnosioca. Pored toga, istraga pokrenuta po krivičnoj prijavi podnosioca mora se razmatrati u celini, obuhvatajući i početne istražne radnje koje je preduzeo Tužilac za ratne zločine i naknadne krivične postupke.

47. U tom kontekstu, Sud primećuje da je zvaničnu istragu o ubistvu oca podnosioca prvi put pokrenulo Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije 2007. godine. Drugi skup krivičnog postupka pokrenut 2016. godine po krivičnoj prijavi podnosioca je i dalje u toku. Prekomerno trajanje postupka je jak pokazatelj da je postupak manjkav do te mere da predstavlja povredu pozitivnih obaveza tužene Države prema Konvenciji, osim ako je država pružila veoma ubedljive i verodostojne razloge koji opravdavaju dužinu postupka (videti Mazepa i dr. protiv Rusije, broj 15086/07, stav 80, od 17. jula 2018. godine, kao i izvore navedene u istoj). Tužena Vlada nije navela takve razloge u predmetnom slučaju.

48. U tom pogledu, Sud konstatuje značajno kašnjenje između ubistva P.Đ. i početka bilo kakve zvanične istrage. Izgleda da nisu preduzete bilo kakve istražne radnje pre 3. marta 2004. godine, kada je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Srbiju. Prvi skup krivičnog postupka pokrenulo je Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije 28. novembra 2007. godine, odnosno 16 godina nakon ubistva i tri godine i osam meseci nakon što je Konvencija stupila na snagu u odnosu na Srbiju. Sȃmi postupci su trajali 13 godina na dva nivoa nadležnosti. Štaviše, nijedna od četiri osobe, koje su prvobitno optužene u vezi sa ubistvom, na kraju nije osuđena (videti st. 7 i 11 gore).

49. U pogledu drugog skupa krivičnog postupka, i bez prejudiciranja ishoda ili zauzimanja stava o krivici D.L. kao optuženog, Sud konstatuje da je prošlo više od devet godina otkako je FHP podneo krivičnu prijavu u ime podnosioca dana 2. novembra 2016. godine. Postupak je i dalje u toku u prvom stepenu (videti stav 22. gore). Sud takođe konstatuje kašnjenje od šest godina između podnošenja krivične prijave i podizanja optužnice (videti st. 12. i 22. gore). Štaviše, prema sopstvenim podnescima Vlade, postojala je osnovana sumnja da je D.L. krivično odgovoran za predmetno ubistvo, nezavisno od i pre krivične prijave koju je podnosilac podneo preko FHP-a (videti st. 8. , 9. i 42. gore). Iz toga sledi da je kašnjenje u pokretanju drugog skupa krivičnog postupka moglo biti čak i značajnije nego što je gore naznačeno, i da se može pripisati tužilačkoj strategiji (videti stav 9. gore).

50. Iako je Sud primio k znanju argument Vlade u vezi sa složenošću predmetnog krivičnog postupka, on ipak ne prihvata da su, s obzirom na to da je predmetna smrt nastupila u situaciji opšteg nasilja, kašnjenja u istrazi bila opravdana usled teških bezbednosnih okolnosti. Nesporno je da se ubistvo dogodilo tokom oružanog sukoba. Međutim, istraga je pokrenuta 2007. godine, više od decenije nakon završetka sukoba, pod okolnostima koje se ne mogu razumno opisati kao okolnosti na koje su uticali bezbednosni problemi (videti stav 5. gore). U svakom slučaju, Vlada nije uspela da potkrepi svoju tvrdnju identifikovanjem bilo kakvih konkretnih prepreka vezanih za bezbednost koje su mogle ometati istragu, niti je pružila dokaze u prilog takvoj tvrdnji. Konačno, Sud konstatuje argument Vlade da je podnosilac doprineo odlaganju time što nije prisustvovao na dva ročišta održana tokom 2024. godine. U vezi s tim, Sud primećuje da se, čak i prema tvrdnji same Vlade, neprisustvovanje prvom ročištu ne može pripisati podnosiocu predstavke, već nemogućnosti hrvatskih vlasti da organizuju video konferenciju (videti stav 23. gore). Što se tiče drugog ročišta, čak i ako se prihvati argument Vlade da je podnosilac doprineo odlaganju time što nije prisustvovao navedenom ročištu, taj faktor, kada se uporedi sa činjenicom da je postupak još uvek u toku u prvom stepenu više od devet godina nakon podnošenja krivične prijave od strane podnosioca (videti stav 12. gore), ne ublažava prekomerno ukupno trajanje istrage.

51. U tim okolnostima, Sud nije uveren da je Vlada pružila ubedljive i verodostojne razloge koji opravdavaju ukupno trajanje istrage, koja obuhvata i postupak koji je vodilo Tužilaštvo za ratne zločine Republike Srbije i krivični postupak pred sudom koji je usledio. Pozivanje na složenost slučaja naročito deluje neubedljivo u odsustvu bilo kakvih opipljivih rezultata u istrazi o onima koji su počinili ili naredili ubistvo, a koja traje već godinama.

52. U svetlu prethodno navedenog i svojih nalaza u vezi sa nedostatkom ažurnosti i razumne brzine postupanja u sprovođenju istrage, Sud zaključuje da istraga o ubistvu P.Đ. nije ispunila standarde delotvornosti koje zahteva član 2. Konvencije.

53. Prema tome, došlo je do povrede člana 2. Konvencije u njegovom procesnom delu.

II. PRIMENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE

54. Član 41 Konvencije glasi:

„Kada Sud utvrdi povredu Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj strani.”

A. Šteta

55. Podnosilac je tražio iznos od 20.000 evra (EUR) na ime nematerijalne štete koju je pretrpeo.

56. Vlada je tvrdila da je takvo potraživanje bilo neosnovano i preterano.

57. Sud dodeljuje podnosiocu predstavke iznos od EUR 12.000 na ime nematerijalne štete, zajedno sa svim porezima koji se mogu naplatiti na taj iznos.

B. Troškovi i izdaci

58. Podnosilac je takođe tražio iznos od ukupno EUR 1.730, u dinarskoj protivvrednosti, na ime troškova i izdataka nastalih u domaćem postupku, kao i na ime troškova i izdataka nastalih pred Sudom.

59. Vlada nije pružila komentare u pogledu ovog potraživanja.

60. Prema sudskoj praksi Suda, podnosilac predstavke ima pravo na povraćaj troškova i izdataka samo u onoj meri u kojoj je dokazano da su stvarno i nužno nastali i da su takođe razumni u pogledu njihovog iznosa. U konkretnom predmetu, imajući u vidu dokumentaciju u njegovom posedu i gorenavedene kriterijume, Sud smatra da je razumno dosuditi podnosiocu predstavke iznos od EUR 1.730, kojim bi se pokrili troškovi i izdaci po svim tačkama, kao i bilo koji porez koji se može naplatiti podnosiocu na taj iznos.

IZ TIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,

1. Proglašava predstavku dopuštenom;

2. Utvrđuje da je došlo do povrede člana 2. Konvencije u njegovom procesnom aspektu;

3. Utvrđuje

(a) da Tužena mora da isplati podnosiocu, u roku od tri meseca od dana kada ova presuda postane pravnosnažna u skladu sa članom 44. stav 2. Konvencije, sledeće iznose koje treba pretvoriti u nacionalnu valutu Tužene po stopi koja se primenjuje na dan isplate:

(i) EUR 12.000 (dvanaest hiljade evra), kao i bilo koji porez koji se može naplatiti na taj iznos, na ime nematerijalne štete;

(ii) EUR 1.730 (hiljadu sedam stotina i trideset evra), kao i bilo koji porez koji se može naplatiti podnosiocu na taj iznos, na ime troškova i izdataka;

(b) da, po isteku gore navedena tri meseca do isplate, treba isplatiti običnu kamatu na gore navedene iznose po stopi koja je jednaka najnižoj kamatnoj stopi Evropske centrale banke uz dodatak od tri procentna poena;

4. Odbacuje preostali deo zahteva podnosioca za pravično zadovoljenje.

Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i dostavljeno u pisanoj formi dana 17. februara 2026. godine, u skladu sa pravilom 77. st. 2. i 3. Poslovnika Suda.

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ĐAKOVIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 30749/22)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
17 February 2026

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Đaković v. Serbia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Ioannis Ktistakis, President,

Peeter Roosma,

Lətif Hüseynov,

Diana Kovatcheva,

Mateja Đurović,

Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,

Vasilka Sancin, judges,

and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 30749/22) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Vilko Đaković (“the applicant”), on 17 June 2022;

the decision to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of the complaint under Article 2 concerning a lack of an effective investigation into the death of the applicant’s father and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

the comments submitted by the Government of Croatia who had exercised their right to intervene pursuant to Article 36 § 1 of the Convention;

Having deliberated in private on 20 January 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The application concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention that the Serbian authorities failed to carry out an effective official investigation into the death of his father, P.Đ.

THE FACTS

2. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Lovas, Croatia. He was represented by Mr M. Pavlović, a lawyer practising in Belgrade.

3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar.

4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

I. KILLING OF THE APPLICANT’S FATHER

5. The incident in question took place in the Croatian village of Lovas during the armed conflict which lasted from 1991 until 1995 and which occurred in the context of war that followed the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

6. On 10 October 1991 the Yugoslav People’s Army, together with a certain number of locally recruited “territorial defence” forces, local police and volunteer forces, shelled and subsequently captured the village of Lovas, where P.Đ. lived. He was shot and killed during the assault.

II. FIRST SET OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (K.PO2 1/2014)

7. On 28 November 2007 the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia indicted 14 individuals for war crimes against the civilian population under Article 142 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was in relation to various acts committed in October 1991 during and after the capture of Lovas. Four of the accused were charged with, inter alia, the killing of P.Đ., while the remaining ten were charged with various crimes committed following the capture of the village.

8. On 28 December 2011 the indictment was amended. The charges against three of the four individuals initially charged with the killing of P.Đ. were dropped in respect of that particular offence, although they remained accused of other crimes. Only Ž.K., who at the relevant time had been serving as commander of the local police station, remained charged with the killing of P.Đ. He was charged for his role in organising and participating in an attack on the village of Lovas and its civilian population on the morning of 10 October 1991. It was alleged that he had acted on the orders of a commander in the Yugoslav People’s Army in directing the assault on the civilian population of Lovas. According to the indictment, the attack had been carried out by an armed group comprising volunteers, members of the local police station and the local “territorial defence” forces. Without specific targets and in the absence of any military necessity, the group had engaged in indiscriminate gunfire using rifles, thrown grenades into courtyards, houses, basements and other premises, killed civilians at those locations and forcibly removed others from their homes before executing them in the streets and elsewhere. Those acts had caused widespread destruction to residential and other civilian buildings and had resulted in the deaths of seven individuals, including P.Đ. The remaining 13 accused were charged in relation to offences committed after that date and following the killing of the applicant’s father.

9. At an unspecified point during the first-instance proceedings, the acting Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor recorded in an official note that certain acts and omissions by D.L. – the commander in the Yugoslav People’s Army alleged to have ordered the attack on the village, who was not among the indictees – gave rise to serious concerns regarding his criminal liability. It was considered, however, that that issue should be addressed following the conclusion of the proceedings against the direct perpetrators, a position supported by the then War Crimes Prosecutor.

10. On 20 June 2019 the Belgrade High Court convicted eight individuals of war crimes committed against civilians in October 1991. Seven convictions related to events unconnected to the killing of the applicant’s father. Ž.K. was found guilty in relation to the events of 10 October 1991. The court established that he had acted on the orders of D.L. in directing the assault on Lovas, during which seven civilians, including P.Đ., had been killed.

11. On 20 November 2020 the Belgrade Court of Appeal amended the first-instance judgment by reducing the sentences in respect of six of the accused and overturned it in respect of Ž.K. and another defendant, acquitting them both.

III. THE APPLICANT’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

12. On 2 November 2016 the Humanitarian Law Centre (Fond za humanitarno pravo – hereinafter “the HLC”) lodged a criminal complaint on behalf of the applicant with the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia against D.L. for war crimes against the civilian population under Article 142 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The complaint alleged that D.L. had ordered an attack on Lovas on 9 October 1991 and directed the involvement of auxiliary forces in operations targeting both armed and civilian persons deemed hostile. It further alleged that he had ordered an artillery assault on 10 October 1991, followed by ground attacks carried out under his command. Those attacks had resulted in the killing of 21 civilians, including P.Đ. The HLC submitted that a reasonable suspicion that D.L. had committed the said acts arose, among other things, from testimonies and other evidence contained in case file K Po2 1/2014 (see paragraphs 7–11 above).

13. On 20 December 2016 the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia informed the HLC that a preliminary investigation was under way and that the allegations raised in the criminal complaint were being reviewed.

14. Between 2 February 2017 and 25 October 2018, the HLC submitted five written prompts to the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia, urging progress in relation to the criminal complaint and requesting information concerning the status of the investigation.

15. On 1 March 2017 the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia informed the HLC that it was in the process of gathering information from relevant State authorities and that a decision regarding further procedural steps would be taken once that process was complete.

16. On 25 October 2018 the HLC submitted a formal objection to the conduct of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia, alleging that its investigation was ineffective and requesting that the proceedings be expedited.

17. On 5 November 2018 the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia dismissed the objection as unfounded.

18. On 8 November 2018 the HLC submitted a further objection to the Public Prosecutor of Serbia concerning the conduct of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, reiterating its allegation that the investigation into the criminal complaint was ineffective.

19. On 22 November 2018 the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Serbia dismissed the objection as unfounded.

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

20. On 3 December 2018 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, alleging, among other things, a violation of his right to an effective investigation as guaranteed under Article 2 of the Convention. The applicant complained that, two years after lodging a criminal complaint, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office had taken no action in the pre-investigation phase, as no injured party or suspect had been questioned, no evidence had been collected, and no order to open an investigation had been issued. The applicant stated that the case was not complex, involving only one accused and evidence already available in another ongoing war crimes case (K Po2 1/2014, see paragraphs 7–11 above). He further maintained that the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office had failed to respond to his requests for information. Referring to the Court’s case-law, the applicant contended that such prolonged inactivity failed to meet the requirement of an effective investigation as recognised by the Constitutional Court and the Convention.

21. On 30 March 2022 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal. In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court referred to the response of the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office to the applicant’s allegations of inactivity, noting that immediately after receiving the criminal complaint, the Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor had collected statements from D.L. and from several retired military officers, while some proposed witnesses had in the meantime passed away. The prosecutor had also examined case file K Po2 1/2014, which concerned the same criminal events in the village of Lovas (see paragraph 7–11 above), and reviewed a case file TRZ Ktr 45/14, opened following a criminal complaint by one of the accused in case K Po2 1/2014, against D.L. That file contained an official note by the Acting Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor indicating that certain actions and omissions of D.L. required serious consideration of his criminal liability, but that it would be appropriate to assess this after the conclusion of the main Lovas case (K Po2 1/2014) against the direct perpetrators, a position approved by the then War Crimes Prosecutor. The Constitutional Court found that, following receipt of the applicant’s criminal complaint of 2 November 2016, the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor had conducted a preliminary investigation and, on 5 February 2021, had formally opened an investigation against D.L. for a war crime against the civilian population in connection with events that included, among other matters, the killing of P.Đ. It therefore held that the applicant’s complaint concerning the lack of an effective investigation was unfounded. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 2 June 2022.

V. SECOND SET OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

22. On 12 September 2022 the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor indicted D.L. for war crimes against the civilian population under Article 142 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in connection with the events in Lovas on 9 and 10 October 1991. The indictment concerned, among other things, the killing of 21 civilians, including P.Đ. The trial commenced on 14 December 2022. The criminal proceedings are currently ongoing at first instance before the Belgrade High Court, with 19 hearings having been scheduled, of which 14 have been held and five have been postponed as of 20 January 2026.

23. The applicant was summoned to testify as a witness in those criminal proceedings on two occasions, in April and July 2024, by means of requests transmitted to the Croatian authorities. On the first occasion, the Croatian Ministry of Justice indicated that it was unable to organise a video link. On the second occasion, the applicant declined to testify on account of illness.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

CRIMINAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

24. The Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (published in the Official Gazette of the SFRY no. 44/76, with amendments published in the Official Gazette nos. 36/77, 34/84, 37/84, 74/87, 57/89, 3/90, 38/90, 45/90 and 54/90, and the Official Gazette of the FRY nos. 35/92, 16/93, 31/93, 37/93 and 24/94) was in force at the relevant time. The relevant provisions thereof read as follows:

Article 142 - War crime against the civilian population

“Anyone who, acting in violation of the rules of international law applicable in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, orders that a civilian population be subjected to killing, torture, inhuman treatment, biological experiments, immense suffering or violation of their bodily integrity or health; dislocation or displacement or forcible conversion to another nationality or religion; forcible prostitution or rape; application of measures of intimidation and terror, hostage-taking, imposition of collective punishment, unlawful transfer to concentration camps or other illegal arrests and detention, deprivation of rights to a fair and impartial trial; forcible service in the armed forces of the enemy’s army or in its intelligence service or administration; forced labour, starvation of the population, property confiscation, pillaging, illegal and intentional destruction or large-scale theft of property that is not justified by military needs, illegal and disproportionate contribution or requisition, devaluation of domestic currency or the unlawful issuance of currency; or who personally commits one of the aforementioned actions, shall be punished by not less than five years’ imprisonment or the death penalty.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

25. The applicant complained that the Serbian authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the killing of his father. He relied on Article 2 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”

A. Admissibility

1. The Government’s objection of abuse of the right of individual application

(a) The parties’ submissions

26. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to inform the Court that, following the lodging of his application with it, the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia had indicted D.L. for war crimes, including the killing of the applicant’s father. Those proceedings are currently ongoing at first instance before the Belgrade High Court (see paragraphs 22–23 above). According to the Government, that omission had not been inadvertent but rather had constituted a “deliberate failure to provide the Court with all relevant information related to the applicant’s case”. The applicant had also failed to inform the Court of his own refusal to testify in the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 23 above). Had he informed the Court of those facts, his application “would probably not have been communicated to the Respondent”. The applicant had thus attempted to conceal the true facts regarding the progress of the investigation and his own contribution to the delays in the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, he had abused his right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

27. The applicant disagreed. He submitted that his legal representative had ceased cooperation with the HLC in July 2023 and that he had therefore been unaware of any subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings, rendering the Government’s allegation of intentional non-disclosure unfounded. He maintained that he had been unable to testify owing to his poor health and not because of any unwillingness on his part. He further emphasised that his testimony was not of decisive importance for the continuation of the proceedings, as he had not been a direct witness to the events in question. His involvement was neither essential to the conduct nor determinative of the outcome of the criminal process. He submitted that the domestic court’s refusal to examine other available evidence, while attributing procedural delays to him, only served to reinforce his argument that the Serbian judicial authorities lacked the will to conclude the proceedings.

(b) The Court’s assessment

(i) Relevant principles

28. The Court reiterates that an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of application under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention if, inter alia, it was knowingly based on untrue facts and false declarations (see, for example, Minić v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18415/20, § 29, 22 October 2024, and the authorities cited therein).

29. The submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may also amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (ibid., § 30). The same applies if important new developments have occurred during the proceedings before the Court and if, despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 7 of the Rules of Court, the applicant has failed to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, with further references).

(ii) Application of those principles to the present case

30. The Court observes that on 12 September 2022, less than three months after the lodging of the present application, the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia initiated a second set of criminal proceedings in respect of war crimes, including the killing of P.Đ. (see paragraph 22 above). It further notes that the applicant did not inform the Court of the commencement of or subsequent progress in those proceedings. The Court is not persuaded by the applicant’s explanation that he was unaware of any developments in the domestic investigation between 12 September 2022 and 25 September 2024, when the respondent Government were given notice of the application. In particular, the Court notes that the applicant was himself summoned on two occasions in 2024 to testify in those proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaint concerns the overall effectiveness of an ongoing investigative process. In that context, the opening of a second set of criminal proceedings formed part of a broader investigative framework, encompassing not only proceedings against direct perpetrators but also the examination of the responsibility of D.L. in his capacity as a commander (see Jelić v. Croatia, no. 57856/11, §§ 88, 90, 94; 12 June 2014, Borojević and Others v. Croatia, no. 70273/11, § 63, 4 April 2017; and mutatis mutandis, Lutsenko and Verbytskyy v. Ukraine, nos. 12482/14 and 39800/14, § 68, 21 January 2021). While the initiation of those proceedings was clearly relevant and should have been brought to the Court’s attention, it did not alter the substance of the applicant’s complaint, which concerns the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation as a whole, in particular the fact that, more than 34 years after the killing of his father, the criminal investigation into that killing remains pending. The Court therefore concludes that, although the applicant should have brought the relevant information to its attention, there is no indication that he intended to mislead the Court regarding any matter central to the case or that his application was knowingly based on false information (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 28-29 above).

31. As regards the Government’s argument concerning the applicant’s alleged refusal to testify in the domestic proceedings, that conduct occurred within the framework of domestic proceedings and not in his dealings with the Court. It follows that the Government’s submissions in this respect are of no relevance to the assessment of any alleged abuse of the right of individual application (see, mutatis mutandis, Paun Jovanović v. Serbia, no. 41394/15, § 50, 7 February 2023).

32. In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion that the applicant’s conduct did not constitute an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

2. Jurisdiction ratione temporis

33. The Court observes that no plea of inadmissibility on account of lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis was made by the Government. However, as this matter goes to the Court’s jurisdiction, it is not precluded from examining it of its own motion (see Petrović v. Serbia, no. 40485/08, § 66, 15 July 2014).

34. The relevant principles concerning the Court’s competence ratione temporis to deal with the merits of an applicant’s complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention are set out in Janowiec and Others v. Russia ([GC], nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, §§ 140-51, ECHR 2013).

35. In particular, the Court’s temporal jurisdiction regarding procedural obligations to investigate under Article 2 of the Convention is strictly limited to procedural acts that were or ought to have been implemented after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of a respondent State (“the critical date”), and it is subject to the existence of a genuine connection between the event giving rise to the above-mentioned procedural obligation under Article 2 and the critical date (ibid., §§ 142 and 145). Such a connection is primarily defined by the temporal proximity between the triggering event and the critical date, which must be separated only by a reasonably short lapse of time that should not normally exceed ten years (ibid., § 146), and it will only be established if much of the investigation took place or ought to have taken place in the period following the entry into force of the Convention (ibid., § 147).

36. The Court has accepted, however, that there may be extraordinary situations that do not satisfy the “genuine connection” standard, as outlined above, but where the need to ensure the real and effective protection of the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention would constitute a sufficient basis for recognising the existence of a connection (ibid., § 149). The Court considers the reference to the underlying values of the Convention to mean that the required connection may be found to exist if the triggering event was of a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and amounted to the negation of the very foundations of the Convention. This would be the case with serious crimes under international law, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the definitions given to them in the relevant international instruments (ibid., § 150).

37. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the complaint in respect of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention concerns the investigation into an event that took place in October 1991. It should be noted that more than 12 years and four months passed between the triggering event and the Convention’s entry into force in respect of Serbia on 3 March 2004.

38. Prior to that date, no procedural steps appear to have been taken in the context of the investigation. It was only after the Convention had entered into force that investigative measures were undertaken, in particular from 2007 onwards, comprising two sets of criminal proceedings for war crimes against the civilian population, which included the killing of the applicant’s father. In other words, the investigation in its entirety was conducted after the critical date, along with all relevant procedural acts. Moreover, although the period between the triggering event and the critical date exceeded ten years, the incident was investigated and prosecuted domestically as a war crime against civilians. That classification indicates that the event was treated as an offence of a gravity beyond that of an ordinary criminal offence. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the case satisfies the requirements of the “Convention values” test (see Krdžalija and Others v. Montenegro (dec.), no. 79065/13, §§ 123-128, 14 March 2023).

39. Consequently, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the application under Article 2 of the Convention, in its procedural aspect, regarding the investigation into the killing of P.Đ.

40. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

41. The applicant submitted that the investigation into his father’s death had been ineffective. He argued that the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia had deliberately delayed progress in a case that was, in his opinion, neither factually nor legally complex. In his view, such conduct gave rise to serious doubts as to the independence of the investigation and indicated a deliberate attempt to avoid the prosecution of those responsible. He emphasised, in particular, the interval of nearly six years between the lodging of the criminal complaint on 2 November 2016 (see paragraph 12 above) and the issuance of the indictment on 12 September 2022 (see paragraph 22 above). He further noted that most of the relevant facts surrounding his father’s death had already been established in the first set of criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 7–11 above), and that the currently ongoing second set of criminal proceedings concerned only one accused, which did not justify their protracted nature.

(b) The respondent Government

42. The Government argued that there had been no breach of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention. The investigation into the killing of the applicant’s father had been conducted by an independent authority, namely the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia, and had been both adequate and effective. The investigation, initiated following the criminal complaint lodged by the HLC on 2 November 2016, had culminated in the indictment of D.L. for a war crime, with criminal proceedings currently ongoing. Although the Government acknowledged a gap of nearly six years between the applicant’s criminal complaint and the indictment, they maintained that the investigation had been prompt, particularly when viewed in the context of the inherent complexity of war crimes cases. Such cases often involve numerous individuals across different countries, significant time lapses, and complex evidence. The proceedings, including those stemming from the applicant’s complaint, typically lead to multiple related cases. Consequently, the standard of promptness applicable to ordinary criminal proceedings could not automatically be applied to such complex matters. The Government placed particular emphasis on the fact that broader criminal proceedings concerning the events in Lovas and involving a larger group of suspects had been initiated as early as 2007, well before the applicant’s criminal complaint had been submitted. During those proceedings, it had already been established that D.L. had ordered an attack on the civilian population of Lovas, following which an order had been made to investigate him (see paragraphs 7-11 above). The Government emphasised that in circumstances such as those of the present case, where deaths occurred amid generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, investigators could encounter substantial obstacles and practical limitations, which might necessitate the adoption of less effective measures or result in delay. They submitted that all reasonable steps had been taken to conduct an effective and independent investigation, even in difficult security conditions. Lastly, the applicant’s procedural rights had been respected, including his involvement as next of kin, by way of his summons to testify, which he had declined. Such an “attitude” on the part of the applicant had rendered it impossible to complete the criminal proceedings in question.

(c) The Government of Croatia

43. The Government of Croatia supported the applicant’s position and submitted that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural limb. They further argued that the ineffective investigation in the present case reflected a broader situation in Serbia in which there was a concerning lack of investigation into war crimes.

2. The Court’s assessment

44. The Court refers to the general principles regarding the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation under Article 2 as summarised in Georgia v. Russia (II) ([GC], no. 38263/08, § 326, 21 January 2021).

45. The Court reiterates at the outset that there is little ground to be overly prescriptive as regards the possibility of an obligation to investigate unlawful killings arising many years after the events since the public interest in obtaining the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators is firmly recognised, particularly in the context of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, § 69, 27 November 2007). The form an investigation must take in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 2 may vary according to the circumstances of the case. Nonetheless, regardless of the method employed, the authorities are required to act on their own initiative once the matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (see Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 165, ECHR 2011). Furthermore, if the investigation leads to the institution of proceedings before the national courts, then the entire proceedings, including the trial stage, must satisfy the Article 2 requirements (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 95, ECHR 2004-XII, and Ali and Ayşe Duran v. Turkey, no. 42942/02, § 61, 8 April 2008). The Court further emphasises the requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition which is implicit in the context of the effectiveness of the domestic proceedings set up to elucidate the circumstances of an individual’s death (see Jelić, cited above, § 91).

46. As a preliminary observation, the Court notes that both in his constitutional appeal and in his application before the Court, the applicant complained of an ineffective investigation into his father’s death, focusing primarily on the allegation that, upon submission of his criminal complaint to the War Crimes Prosecutor in 2016 (see paragraphs 12 to 19 above), the War Crimes Prosecutor did not react promptly or efficiently. While the applicant’s complaint centred on the handling of his criminal complaint, he also relied on the fact that a first set of criminal proceedings had been initiated in 2007 (see paragraph 41 above), and he had referred to this in his criminal complaint (see paragraph 12 above) and his constitutional appeal (see paragraph 20 above). Moreover, the fact that the death of the applicant’s father had already been the subject of criminal proceedings was explicitly invoked by the Constitutional Court when dismissing the applicant’s constitutional complaint (see paragraph 21 above) and by the Government in their observations before the Court (see paragraph 42 above). Accordingly, when assessing the effectiveness of the investigation initiated by the applicant’s criminal complaint, the Court, which is bound by the scope of the case “referred to” it in the exercise of the right of individual application as determined by the applicant’s complaint (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 109, 20 March 2018), must also have regard to the fact that criminal proceedings had been ongoing since 2007, prior to the lodging of the applicant’s complaint. In addition, the investigation initiated upon the applicant’s criminal complaint must be considered in its entirety, encompassing both the initial investigative measures undertaken by the War Crimes Prosecutor and the subsequent criminal proceedings.

47. Against that backdrop, the Court observes that the official investigation into the killing of the applicant’s father was first initiated by the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia in 2007. The second set of criminal proceedings initiated in 2016 upon the applicant’s criminal complaint remains ongoing. The excessive length of proceedings is a strong indication that the proceedings are defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under the Convention, unless the State has provided highly convincing and plausible reasons to justify the length of the proceedings (see Mazepa and Others v. Russia, no. 15086/07, § 80, 17 July 2018, and the authorities cited therein). No such reasons have been provided by the respondent Government in the present case.

48. In this regard, the Court notes the significant delay between the killing of P.Đ. and the commencement of any official investigation. No investigative measures appear to have been taken prior to 3 March 2004, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Serbia. The first set of criminal proceedings was initiated by the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia on 28 November 2007, that is, 16 years after the killing and three years and eight months after the Convention had entered into force in respect of Serbia. Those proceedings themselves lasted 13 years across two levels of jurisdiction. Moreover, none of the four individuals initially charged in connection with the killing was ultimately convicted (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above).

49. With regard to the second set of criminal proceedings, and without prejudging the outcome or taking a position on the culpability of D.L., the accused, the Court notes that more than nine years have passed since the HLC lodged a criminal complaint on behalf of the applicant on 2 November 2016. The proceedings remain pending at first instance (see paragraph 22 above). The Court also notes the delay of six years between the lodging of the complaint and the issuance of the indictment (see paragraphs 12 and 22 above). Moreover, according to the Government’s own submissions, there were grounds to suspect that D.L. was criminally responsible for the killing in question independently of and prior to the complaint lodged by the applicant through the HLC (see paragraphs 8, 9 and 42 above). It follows that the delay in initiating the second set of criminal proceedings may have been even more substantial than indicated above and attributable to a prosecutorial strategy (see paragraph 9 above).

50. While the Court has taken note of the Government’s argument concerning the complexity of the criminal proceedings in issue, it does not accept that, as the death had occurred in a situation of generalised violence, the delays in the investigation were justified on account of difficult security circumstances. It is undisputed that the killing occurred during an armed conflict. However, the investigation was initiated in 2007, over a decade after the conflict had ended, under circumstances that cannot reasonably be described as being affected by security issues (see paragraph 5 above). In any event, the Government have failed to substantiate their assertion by identifying any specific security-related obstacles that may have impeded the investigation, nor have they provided evidence in support of such a claim. Lastly, the Court notes the Government’s argument that the applicant contributed to the delay by failing to attend two hearings in 2024. In this connection the Court observes that, even according to the Government themselves, the failure to attend the first hearing cannot be attributed to the applicant but rather to the inability of the Croatian authorities to organise a video conference (see paragraph 23 above). Regarding the second hearing, even accepting the Government’s argument that the applicant contributed to the delay by failing to attend it, that factor, when weighed against the fact that the proceedings are still pending at first instance more than nine years after the submission of the applicant’s criminal complaint (see paragraph 12 above), does not mitigate the investigation’s excessive overall length.

51. In those circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that the Government have provided convincing and plausible reasons to justify the overall length of the investigation, which encompasses both the proceedings conducted by the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia and the ensuing criminal trial. In particular, the reference to the complexity of the case appears unpersuasive in the absence of any tangible results in the investigation concerning those who committed or ordered the killing, which has been protracted for many years.

52. In the light of the foregoing and its findings regarding the lack of promptness and reasonable expedition in conducting the investigation, the Court concludes that the investigation into the killing of P.Đ. did not meet the effectiveness standards required under Article 2 of the Convention.

53. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural limb.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

54. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

55. The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

56. The Government submitted that the claim was unfounded and excessive.

57. The Court awards the applicant EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

B. Costs and expenses

58. The applicant also claimed approximately EUR 1,730, in Serbian dinars, for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court.

59. The Government did not comment.

60. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to their quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,730 covering costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural aspect;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,730 (one thousand seven hundred and thirty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.