TREĆE ODELJENjE

PREDMET PEŠIĆ PROTIV SRBIJE
(Predstavka broj 4545/21)

PRESUDA

STRAZBUR
13. januar 2026. godine

Ova presuda će postati pravosnažna pod uslovima iz člana 44. stav 2. Konvencije. Može biti predmet redakcijskih izmena.

U predmetu Pešić protiv Srbije,

Evropski sud za ljudska prava (Treće odeljenje), na zasedanju Veća u sastavu:

Ioannis Ktistakis, predsednik,

Lətif Hüseynov,

Darian Pavli,

Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,

Mateja Đurović,

Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,

Vasilka Sancin, sudije,

i Milan Blaško, sekretar Odeljenja,

Imajući u vidu:

predstavku (broj 4545/21) protiv Republike Srbije, koju je državljanka Republike Srbije gospođa Vesna Pešić (u daljem tekstu: podnositeljka) podnela Sudu 15. decembra 2020. godine u skladu sa članom 34. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija);

odluku da se Vlada Republike Srbije (u daljem tekstu: Vlada) obavesti o pritužbama koje se tiču slobode izražavanja podnositeljke, njenog pristupa sudu i pravičnosti građanskog postupka po članu 6. stav 1. i članu 10. Konvencije;

zapažanja stranaka;

Nakon većanja na zatvorenoj sednici 25. novembra 2025. godine,

Donosi sledeću presudu, koja je usvojena tog dana:

UVOD

1. Predmet predstavke se odnosi na slobodu izražavanja podnositeljke prema članu 10. i njeno pravo na pristup sudu prema članu 6. Konvencije. Ona je tvrdila da naknada štete dosuđena protiv nje u građanskom postupku koji je pokrenuo javni funkcioner predstavlja neopravdano mešanje u njena prava iz člana 10. Dalje, navela je da je građanski postupak bio nepravičan, jer joj nije bilo dozvoljeno da postavi određena pitanja tužiocu, i da je naknadna presuda Ustavnog suda bila „neadekvatno obrazložena”. Na kraju, podnositeljka je tvrdila da je odbijanje Vrhovnog kasacionog suda Srbije da razmotri njenu reviziju predstavljalo kršenje njenog prava na pristup sudu iz člana 6.

ČINjENICE

2. Podnositeljka je rođena 1940. godine i živi u Beogradu. Nju je zastupala gospođa K. Kostić, advokatica iz istog grada.

3. Vladu je zastupala njena zastupnica, gospođa Z. Jadrijević Mladar.

4. Činjenice u vezi sa predmetom mogu se sumirati na sledeći način.

I. RELEVANTNI KONTEKST

5. U ranim jutarnjim satima 25. aprila 2016. godine, kao deo građevinskog projekta, brojni objekti u centru Beograda su srušeni upotrebom teške mehanizacije. Tokom operacije, neidentifikovani počinioci su nezakonito lišili slobode nekoliko osoba prisutnih u tom području, pustivši ih tek nakon završetka rušenja. Ove osobe su potom kontaktirale policiju, koja nije reagovala niti se pojavila na licu mesta. Istraga o ovim događajima je, čini se, u toku.

6. Dana 12. maja 2016. godine, tadašnji ministar unutrašnjih poslova u Vladi Republike Srbije, N.S., dao je javnu izjavu u vezi sa predmetnim događajima. Između ostalog, izjavio je sledeće:

„Međutim, kada je u pitanju ugrožavanje života policajaca – na primer, kada su presečeni električni kablovi – policija ne interveniše niti ulazi u područje dok se pretnja po njihovu bezbednost ne neutrališe.”

II. ČLANAK KOJI JE OBJAVILA PODNOSITELJKA PREDSTAVKE

7. Podnositeljka, bivša političarka i dugogodišnja politička aktivistkinja, objavila je 13. maja 2016. godine članak pod naslovom „Dosoljavanje” na veb-sajtu udruženja građana „Peščanik”, čiji je bila redovni saradnik. Relevantni deo članka glasi:

„... Dobro, sve je to provaljeno. Jedino je glupost ministra policije Nebojše Stefanovića [N.S.]. nenadmašna i nepredvidiva. Dosada nismo otkrili zašto je baš njemu dodeljena uloga da ispadne najgluplji. Možda zato što se on uvek pojavljuje posle Vučića da „zapuši” preostale rupe. I kakve bisere je prosuo ovoga puta? Izjavio je da je „spin” to što je glavna vest u Srbiji rušenje tri nelegalna objekta u Savamali. Baš samo tri objekta? A videsmo onu gomilu šuta koju bageri danima uklanjaju, a i rušenje je trajalo celu noć. Ministar je mudro dodao da rušenje na takav način ne sme da se dešava, ali i kad se desi, nikako ne treba da bude glavna vest u Srbiji. Nego valjda treba da bude sporedna, ili da je i nema kao vesti da maskirani ljudi noću nelegalno ruše centar grada i vrše sijaset krivičnih dela. Jeste mu to mnogo glupo, ali ovo što sledi je najgluplje. Na pitanje novinarke zašto policija nije reagovala kada su je unesrećeni čuvari i vlasnici objekata u Savamali obavestili šta se dešava, on je rekao da policija nije smela da reaguje, jer nije dozvoljeno ugrožavati živote policajaca! Mogla je, kaže ministar, da ih ubije električna struja iz porušenih objekata. I eto šta je ispalo – policija služi tome da čuva policiju! A građani, njima šta bog da, neka ih udari struja. U stvari, tako im i treba. Ministar je lepo objasnio da se radi o građanima čiji su objekti služili „za sticanje bogatstva”, da su to „građevine dobijene spregom politike i tajkuna”.

...

I za kraj, ministrovo obećanje da će sve biti istraženo. A i ovo ćemo istražiti. Istraga će pokazati sve. Pod uslovom da je struja isključena. I ako se prestane sa spinovanjem kako je to rušenje neka mnogo važna stvar. A ispalo je da jeste mnogo važna, jer je razbojničko gaženje zakona, prava građana i rušenje grada postalo nepodnošljivo.

III. GRAĐANSKI POSTUPAK

8. Ministar unutrašnjih poslova, N.S., podneo je 27. jula 2016. godine građansku tužbu protiv podnositeljke, udruženja „Peščanik” i njegovih glavnih urednika, S.L. i S.V., pred Višim sudom u Beogradu (u daljem tekstu: Viši sud), tražeći 200.000 srpskih dinara (RSD) kao naknadu za nematerijalnu štetu. Potraživanje je zasnovano na navodnom duševnom bolu izazvanom napadom na njegovu čast i ugled.

9. Viši sud je 27. aprila 2018. godine održao ročište na kojem su i N.S., kao tužilac, i podnositeljka kao tužena, dali iskaze. Tokom postupka, podnositeljka se bavila pitanjima koja su se odnosila na političku odgovornost ministra, izjavama koje je tadašnji premijer dao u vezi sa opozicionim strankama i jednom od vladajućih stranaka, čiji je N.S. bio član. Sudija je dva puta uputio podnositeljku da ograniči svoje izjave na pitanja relevantna za slučaj i da izbegava političke govore tokom ročišta. Viši sud je takođe odbio određena pitanja postavljena N.S.-u kao irelevantna.

10. Viši sud je 10. jula 2018. godine doneo presudu u korist N.S., usvajajući njegov tužbeni zahtev. U svom obrazloženju, utvrdio je da su primedbe podnositeljke u vezi sa „glupošću” N.S.-a prevazišle dozvoljene granice prihvatljive kritike izjava i postupaka N.S.-a, što predstavlja ličnu uvredu. Utvrđeno je da je podnositeljka zlonamerno i netačno predstavila izjavu N.S.-a. Viši sud je utvrdio da sporni tekst nije doprineo javnom diskursu o događaju niti je pokušao da se pozabavi predmetnim pitanjem. Umesto toga, njegov cilj je bio da omalovaži N.S., subjektivno ga okarakteriše i napadne njegovo dostojanstvo, ugled i čast, čime mu je naneta duševna bol. Dok je podnositeljka tvrdila da su korišćeni izrazi njeni vrednosni sudovi zasnovani na činjeničnom kontekstu nasilnih rušenja u naselju Savamala u Beogradu, Viši sud je odbacio ove tvrdnje kao neosnovane i pokušaj izbegavanja odgovornosti. Shodno tome, na osnovu člana 200. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (videti dole navedeni stav 23), sud je naložio tuženima da solidarno plate N.S.-u 200.000 dinara (približno 1.710 evra (EUR) u to vreme) na ime naknade nematerijalne štete i 95.100 dinara (približno 810 EUR) za troškove i izdatke, kao i kamatu.

11. Podnositeljka se žalila na presudu, pozivajući se, naročito, na član 10. Konvencije i praksu Suda. Odvojeno, udruženje „Peščanik” je zajedno sa S.L. i S.V. podnelo sopstvenu žalbu.

12. Apelacioni sud u Beogradu je 17. oktobra 2018. godine odbio obe žalbe i preinačio presudu Višeg suda, smanjivši naknadu štete dosuđenu N.S.-u na 150.000 dinara (približno 1.280 evra) i naknadu troškova i izdataka na 93.100 dinara (približno 800 evra). U svom obrazloženju, Apelacioni sud je naglasio da „nisu svi načini prenošenja ideja i mišljenja deo slobode izražavanja, jer sloboda izražavanja ne može protivrečiti sopstvenoj svrsi”. Dalje je napomenuo da članak podnositeljke nije doprineo javnoj debati o predmetnom pitanju niti je pokušao da se pozabavi određenim pitanjem; nego, čini se da je njegova namera bila isključivo da uvredi N.S. Na kraju, Apelacioni sud je zaključio da, iako su vrednosni sudovi generalno dozvoljeni, vrednosni sudovi koji su klevetničke prirode i nisu u javnom interesu su nedopustivi.

13. Podnositeljka je 5. decembra 2018. godine podnela reviziju Vrhovnom kasacionom sudu. Odvojeno, udruženje „Peščanik”, S.L. i S.V. su podneli sopstvenu reviziju.

14. Podnositeljka je 20. decembra 2018. godine podnela ustavnu žalbu Ustavnom sudu protiv presude Apelacionog suda od 17. oktobra 2018. godine (videti gore navedeni stav 12). Odvojeno, udruženje „Peščanik”, S.L. i S.V. su takođe podneli sopstvenu ustavnu žalbu protiv iste presude.

15. Vrhovni kasacioni sud je 21. marta 2019. godine odbacio obe revizije (videti gore navedeni stav 13). U svom obrazloženju, Vrhovni kasacioni sud je naglasio da podnositeljka, udruženje „Peščanik”, S.L. i S.V. nisu imali pravo da podnesu reviziju, jer je takva revizija dozvoljena samo stranci čija su prava „umanjena ili uskraćena” drugostepenom presudom. S obzirom na to da je Apelacioni sud smanjio naknadu štete dosuđenu N.S.-u, samo je N.S. mogao da podnese reviziju protiv iste (videti stav 12 iznad).

16. Podnositeljka je 8. avgusta 2019. godine podnela još jednu ustavnu žalbu Ustavnom sudu, tvrdeći, posebno, da je odbacivanje njene revizije od strane Vrhovnog kasacionog suda povredilo njeno pravo na pristup sudu. Podnositeljka je zatražila da se ova ustavna ustavna žalba spoji sa njenom ranijom ustavnom žalbom od 20. decembra 2018. godine (videti gore navedeni stav 14).

17. Dana 9. avgusta 2019. godine, udruženje „Peščanik”, S.L. i S.V. su podneli sopstvenu ustavnu žalbu protiv presude Vrhovnog kasacionog suda od 21. marta 2019. godine.

18. Ustavni sud je 4. juna 2020. godine odbacio ustavne žalbe koje je podnositeljka podnela 20. decembra 2018. i 8. avgusta 2019. godine (videti gore navedene st. 14 i 16). U odnosu na posebne pritužbe koje su se odnosile na slobodu izražavanja, utvrđeno je da u ustavnoj žalbi nisu navedeni relevantni ustavnopravni razlozi, već je zahtevana ponovna procena zakonitosti osporenih presuda, što je van nadležnosti tog suda kao ustavnog tela. Ustavni sud se takođe složio sa nalazom Vrhovnog kasacionog suda da podnositeljka nije imala pravo da podnese reviziju. Odluka Ustavnog suda je dostavljena zastupniku podnositeljke 16. juna 2020. godine.

IV. RAZVOJ DOGAĐAJA NAKON DOSTAVLJANjA PREDSTAVKE VLADI

19. Dana 19. marta 2024. godine, nakon što je predstavka u ovom slučaju dostavljena Vladi, podnositeljka je obavestila Sud da je Ustavni sud doneo odluku (Už-8174/2019) 11. marta 2024. godine, koja se ticala ustavne žalbe podnete od strane udruženja „Peščanik”, S.L.-a i S.V.-a 9. avgusta 2019. godine (videti gore navedeni stav 17). U odluci, Ustavni sud je utvrdio da je Vrhovni kasacioni sud (koji je u međuvremenu preimenovan u Vrhovni sud 11. maja 2023. godine) povredio pravo podnosilaca ustavne žalbe na pravično suđenje odbacivanjem njihove revizije (videti stav 15 iznad). Ustavni sud je stoga poništio odluku Vrhovnog kasacionog suda od 21. marta 2019. godine i naložio Vrhovnom sudu da ponovo razmotri žalbu po spornim pravnim pitanjima. Štaviše, Ustavni sud je pojasnio da se njegova odluka podjednako primenjuje i na podnositeljku lično, budući da je ona bila „u istoj pravnoj situaciji kao i podnosioci ustavnih žalbi”. Do danas, stranke nisu obavestile Sud o ishodu novog postupka pred Vrhovnim sudom (25. novembar 2025. godine).

RELEVANTNI PRAVNI OKVIR

I. ZAKON O JAVNOM INFORMISANjU I MEDIJIMA, OBJAVLJEN U „SLUŽBENOM GLASNIKU REPUBLIKE SRBIJE”, BR. 83/14, 58/15 I 12/16 – AUTENTIČNO TUMAČENjE)

20. U vreme predmetnog događaja, član 8. Zakona o javnom informisanju i medijima propisivao je, između ostalog, da izabrani, imenovani ili postavljeni nosioci javnih ili političkih funkcija moraju tolerisati izražavanje stavova koji kritikuju njihove postupke u obavljanju funkcije ili politike koje sprovode u svojoj ulozi, bez obzira na bilo kakvu ličnu uvredu koju bi mogli pretrpeti zbog takvih stavova.

II. ZAKON O OBLIGACIONIM ODNOSIMA, OBJAVLJEN U SLUŽBENOM LISTU SOCIJALISTIČKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE BR. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 I 57/89, U SLUŽBENOM LISTU SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE BROJ 31/78 I „SLUŽBENOM GLASNIKU REPUBLIKE SRBIJE”, BROJ 18/20)

21. Član 154. ovog zakona navodi različite osnove po kojima se može zahtevati naknada štete.

22. Član 199. propisuje da, u slučaju povrede ličnih prava, sudovi mogu naložiti da se njihove presude objave ili da se objava ispravi, odnosno mogu naložiti licu koje je prouzrokovalo štetu da povuče izjave koje su prouzrokovale povredu.

23. Član 200. posebno propisuje da svako ko je pretrpeo strah, fizički bol ili duševnu bol kao posledicu povrede svog prava na ugled, lični integritet, slobodu ili druga prava ličnosti ima pravo da traži finansijsku nadoknadu pred građanskim sudovima i, pored toga, da zahteva druge slične oblike naknade štete „koji bi mogli da omoguće” pružanje odgovarajuće nematerijalne satisfakcije.

PRAVO

I. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 10. KONVENCIJE

24. Podnositeljka se prituživala na osnovu čl. 6. i 10. Konvencije da su parnični postupak koji je pokrenut protiv nje i naknada štete koju je obavezana da plati predstavljali kršenje njenog prava na slobodu izražavanja. Podnositeljka se dalje prituživala da je sporni parnični postupak bio nepravičan zbog: (a) ograničenja koja su joj bila nametnuta tokom svedočenja na sudu i (b) nedostatka pravilnog obrazloženja u odluci Ustavnog suda od 4. juna 2020. godine.

25. Budući da je gospodar karakterizacije prava koja su primenljiva činjenicama bilo kog slučaja u postupku (videti, na primer, Radomilja i dr. protiv Hrvatske [VV], br. 37685/10 i 22768/12, st. 114 i 126, od 20. marta 2018. godine), Sud smatra da sve gore navedene pritužbe treba ispitati isključivo na osnovu člana 10. Konvencije (videti, mutatis mutandis, Hrachya Harutyunyan protiv Jermenije, broj 15028/16, st. 31–32, od 27. avgusta 2024. godine).

26. Član 10. Konvencije glasi:

„1. Svako ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Ovo pravo uključuje slobodu mišljenja i primanja i saopštavanja informacija i ideja bez uplitanja javnih organa ...

2. Ostvarivanje ovih sloboda, budući da sa sobom nosi dužnosti i odgovornosti, može biti podložno takvim formalnostima, uslovima, ograničenjima ili kaznama koje su propisane zakonom i koje su neophodne u demokratskom društvu... radi zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih...”

A. Dopuštenost

1. Da li podnositeljka predstavke ima status žrtve

27. Vlada je tvrdila da je podnositeljka izgubila status žrtve na osnovu toga što je Ustavni sud, u svojoj odluci od 11. marta 2024. godine, izričito priznao da je Vrhovni kasacioni sud povredio pravo podnositeljke na pravično suđenje odbacivanjem njenu reviziju (videti stav 19 iznad).

28. Podnositeljka je osporila navode Vlade, tvrdeći da i dalje ima status žrtve, uprkos odluci Ustavnog suda.

29. Sud ponavlja da je prva dužnost nacionalnih organa da otklone svaku povredu Konvencije i da prilikom procene da li podnosilac predstavke može tvrditi da je stvarna žrtva navodne povrede, treba uzeti u obzir ne samo formalni položaj u vreme kada je zahtev podnet Sudu, već i sve okolnosti predmetnog slučaja, uključujući i sve događaje pre datuma ispitivanja slučaja od strane Suda (videti Tănase protiv Moldavije [VV], broj 7/08, stav 105, ECLJP 2010).

30. Odluka ili mera povoljna za podnosioca predstavke, u načelu, nije dovoljna da ga liši statusa „žrtve” u svrhu člana 34. Konvencije, osim ukoliko su nacionalni organi priznali kršenje Konvencije, bilo izričito ili suštinski, a zatim i pružili pravnu zaštitu u kontekstu istog (videti, između mnogih drugih izvora, Kurić i dr. protiv Slovenije [VV], broj 26828/06, stav 259, ECLJP 2012 (izvodi)).

31. Uzimajući u obzir gore navedeno, a posebno pitanje „priznanja”, Sud primećuje da Ustavni sud nije, čak ni suštinski, utvrdio povredu prava garantovanih članom 10. Konvencije u slučaju podnositeljke. Stoga smatra da se status žrtve podnositeljke u vezi sa njenim pritužama po toj odredbi ne može dovesti u pitanje, te odbacuje prigovor koji je Vlada iznela u vezi sa tim.

2. Da li je podnositeljka predstavke pretrpela značajnu štetu

32. Vlada je dalje tvrdila da podnositeljka nije pretrpela značajnu štetu, u smislu člana 35. stav 3(b) Konvencije. Napomenula je da je, prema presudi Višeg suda od 10. jula 2018. godine, podnositeljki naloženo da, zajedno sa S.L., S.V. i udruženjem „Peščanik”, isplati ukupan iznos od 243.000 dinara, što je u vreme predmetnog slučaja ekvivalentno približno 2.000 evra. Vlada je dodala da pojedinačni udeo podnositeljke u dosuđenoj naknadi, koji iznosi oko 500 evra, treba smatrati beznačajnim.

33. Podnositeljka je priznala da nije pretrpela značajnu finansijsku štetu. Međutim, tvrdila je da poštovanje ljudskih prava zahteva ispitivanje predstavke u meritumu. Po njenom mišljenju, bilo je neophodno poslati jasnu poruku sudskim i upravnim organima u Srbiji da sloboda izražavanja obuhvata pravo na upotrebu grubog jezika prilikom kritikovanja visokih državnih zvaničnika. Naglasila je da zaštita časti takvih zvaničnika ne bi trebalo da ima prednost nad slobodom izražavanja, naročito u kontekstu političkog diskursa u medijima.

34. Kriterijum nepostojanja značajnog oštećenja zasniva se na ideji da povreda prava po Konvenciji, koliko god stvarna bila sa čisto pravne tačke gledišta, treba da dostigne minimalni nivo ozbiljnosti da bi opravdala razmatranje od strane Suda. Procena ovog minimuma je relativna i zavisi od svih okolnosti slučaja, a težina povrede treba da se proceni uzimajući u obzir i subjektivne percepcije podnosioca predstavke i ono što je objektivno bilo u pitanju. Međutim, čak i ako se utvrdi da podnosilac predstavk nije pretrpeo značajnu štetu kao rezultat stvari na koju se pritužuje, predstavka se ipak ne može proglasiti neprihvatljivom po ovom osnovu ako poštovanje ljudskih prava, kako je definisano u Konvenciji i protokolima uz nju, zahteva suštinsko ispitivanje (videti, kao skorašnji izvor, X i dr. protiv Irske, br. 23851/20 i 24360/20, stav 63, od 22. juna 2023. godine).

35. Sud je takođe utvrdio da, u slučajevima koji se tiču slobode izražavanja, primena kriterijuma prihvatljivosti sadržanog u članu 35. stav 3(b) Konvencije treba da uzme u obzir značaj ove slobode (videti Gachechiladze protiv Gruzije, broj 2591/19, stav 40, od 22. jula 2021. godine) i da bude predmet pažljivog ispitivanja samog Suda. Ovo ispitivanje treba da obuhvati, između ostalog, elemente kao što su doprinos debati od opšteg interesa i da li se slučaj odnosi na štampu ili druge medije (videti, na primer, Sylka protiv Poljske (odluka), broj 19219/07, stav 28, od 3. juna 2014. godine, sa daljim upućivanjima).

36. Primenjujući ova načela na konkretan slučaj, Sud napominje da je predmetno pitanje očigledno bilo od značajnog subjektivnog značaja za podnositeljku, koja je smatrala da navodno kršenje pokreće pitanje principa. Konkretno, parnični postupak je, po njenom mišljenju, bio usko povezan sa njenim osnovnim pravom da kritikuje postupke visokih javnih funkcionera putem medija. Što se tiče onoga što je objektivno bilo u pitanju, uloga podnositeljke kao redovnog autora kolumni za veb-sajt udruženja „Peščanik” naglašava širi kontekst navodnog kršenja. Mešanje se stoga mora proceniti u svetlu suštinske uloge koju slobodna štampa igra u obezbeđivanju pravilnog funkcionisanja demokratskog društva (videti Falzon protiv Malte, broj 45791/13, stav 57, od 20. marta 2018. godine, u vezi sa činjeničnim okolnostima veoma sličnim onima u ovom slučaju u pogledu statusa podnosioca zahteva kao autora kolumni). Shodno tome, navodno kršenje člana 10. Konvencije u ovom slučaju zaista pokreće „važno pitanje načela”. Sud je stoga uveren da se ne može reći da podnositeljka nije pretrpela značajnu štetu kao rezultat parničnog postupka, bez obzira na relativno neznatne novčane posledice za nju na koje se poziva Vlada. Stoga, Sud ne smatra da je potrebno razmatrati da li bi ga poštovanje ljudskih prava obavezalo da ispita slučaj, odnosno da li je domaći sud isto pravilno razmotrio (videti, mutatis mutandis, M.N. i dr. protiv San Marina, broj 28005/12, stav 39, od 7. jula 2015. godine).

37. Shodno tome, prigovor Vlade u ovom kontekstu mora biti odbačen.

3. Zaključak

38. Sud primećuje da ova pritužba nije ni očigledno neosnovana niti neprihvatljiva po bilo kom drugom osnovu navedenom u članu 35. Konvencije. Stoga se mora proglasiti prihvatljivom.

B. Osnovanost

1. Podnesci stranaka

(a) Podnositeljka predstavke

39. Podnositeljka je tvrdila da nalog za isplatu naknade štete, koji je izdao Viši sud zbog objavljivanja njenog navodno uvredljivog članka, predstavlja jasno mešanje u njenu slobodu izražavanja, zagarantovanu članom 10. Konvencije. Tvrdila je da je Viši sud trebalo da zasniva svoju odluku na zaštiti koja je novinarima data Zakonom o javnom informisanju i medijima, umesto da primenjuje odredbe o odgovornosti Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (videti gore navedene st. 20-23). Iako je priznala da je presuda težila legitimnom cilju zaštite prava drugih, podnositeljka je tvrdila da je izrečena naknada štete ipak bila nesrazmerna. Posebno je tvrdila da domaći sudovi takođe nisu uspeli da pronađu odgovarajuću ravnotežu između njenog prava da slobodno izrazi mišljenje i prava N.S. da zaštiti svoje dostojanstvo kao javnog funkcionera, od koga se, po svom položaju, trebalo očekivati da toleriše kritike svog profesionalnog ponašanja, čak i ako ih je doživljavao kao lično uvredljive.

40. Podnositeljka je dalje navela da je njena kritika postupaka N.S.-a bila motivisana informacijama koje su bile dostupne u to vreme, što ju je navelo da veruje da je njegovo objašnjenje – da policija nije delovala zbog prisustva kablova visokog napona – samo izmišljeno opravdanje. Na kraju, podnositeljka je navela da je objašnjenje N.S.-a o tome zašto policija nije izvršila svoju dužnost smatrala toliko neubedljivim da joj je ostavilo utisak da je on zapravo istovremeno potcenio inteligenciju srpske javnosti i time pokazao sopstveni nedostatak rasuđivanja.

(b) Vlada

41. Vlada nije osporila da je sporna presuda predstavljala mešanje u pravo podnositeljke na slobodu izražavanja. Međutim, ovo mešanje je bilo zakonito prema Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima i težilo je legitimnom cilju zaštite ugleda N.S.-a. Dalje je tvrdila da je mešanje bilo srazmerno tom cilju, naglašavajući da je naknada štete dosuđena protiv podnositeljke bila rezultat parničnog postupka, a ne krivičnog gonjenja, i da dosuđeni iznos nije bio preteran.

42. Vlada je dodala da članak podnositeljke nije dao suštinski doprinos javnoj debati o predmetnom pitanju i da moraju postojati razumne granice tolerancije N.S.-a na kritiku, koje je podnositeljka u ovom slučaju prekoračila. Tvrdila je da je podnositeljka i sama poznata javna ličnost, što razlikuje njen položaj od položaja privatnih lica ili novinara, i da ona ne zaslužuje isti nivo zaštite. Objavljivanje članka na internetu proširilo je njegov domet i stoga je imalo ozbiljnije posledice po privatni život N.S.-a. Konačno, izbor jezika podnositeljke – izrazi kao što su „glup”, „najgluplji” i „nenadmašna i nepredvidiva... glupost” – predstavljali su uvrede ad hominem, a ne legitimnu kritiku.

2. Procena Suda

(a) Postojanje dela uplitanja

43. Nije sporno između stranaka da je presuda kojom je podnositeljki naloženo da plati odštetu u parničnom postupku predstavljala „mešanje javnog organa” u njeno pravo na slobodu izražavanja. Takvo mešanje krši Konvenciju ukoliko ne ispunjava zahteve iz člana 10. stav 2. Stoga se mora utvrditi da li je mešanje bilo „propisano zakonom”, da li je težilo jednom ili više legitimnih ciljeva navedenih u tom stavu i da li je bilo „neophodno u demokratskom društvu” za postizanje relevantnog cilja ili ciljeva.

(b) Da li je mešanje bilo propisano zakonom

44. Sud primećuje da su se domaći sudovi prilikom nalaganja podnositeljki da plati naknadu štete N.S.-u oslanjali na opšte odredbe o odgovornosti sadržane u Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima (videti gore navedene st. 10, 12. i st. 21–23.). Stoga se zaključuje da je konkretno mešanje zapravo „propisano zakonom” u smislu člana 10. stav 2. Konvencije.

(v) Da li je mešanje imalo legitiman cilj

45. Sud primećuje da nije sporno između strana da je mešanje težilo jednom od ciljeva navedenih u članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije, naime „zaštita ugleda ili prava drugih”, te ne vidi razlog da drugačije presudi.

(g) Da li je mešanje bilo „neophodno u demokratskom društvu”

(i) Opšta načela

46. Opšta načela za procenu neophodnosti mešanja u ostvarivanje slobode izražavanja navedena su, između ostalog, u predmetu Morice, gore citiranom, stav 124, ESLJP 2015); Bédat protiv Švajcarske ([Vv], broj 56925/08, st. 48–54, od 29. marta 2016. godine); Medžlis Islamske zajednice Brčko i dr. protiv Bosne i Hercegovine ([Vv], broj 17224/11, stav 75, od 27. juna 2017. godine); i SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação protiv Portugala (broj 29856/13, st. 54–62, od 27. jula 2021. godine).

47. Da bi ispunila svoju pozitivnu obavezu da zaštiti prava jedne osobe prema članu 8, država bi eventualno morala do neke mere da ograniči prava obezbeđena članom 10. drugoj osobi. Kada ispituje neophodnost tog ograničenja u demokratskom društvu u interesu „zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih”, od Suda se može zahtevati da proveri da li su domaći organi uspostavili pravičnu ravnotežu kada su štitili dve vrednosti zagarantovane Konvencijom, koje mogu doći u sukob jedna sa drugom u određenim slučajevima, naime, s jedne strane, sloboda izražavanja zaštićena članom 10. i, s druge, pravo na poštovanje privatnog života kako je sadržano u članu 8. (pogledati slučaj Bédat, stav 74, i Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko i dr., stav77, oba gore citirani, sa daljim upućivanjem).

48. Sud je zaključio da države ugovornice imaju određenu slobodu procene prilikom ocene neophodnosti i obima bilo kakvog mešanja u slobodu izražavanja zaštićenom članom 10. Konvencije. Visok nivo zaštite slobode izražavanja, uz posebno usko polje procene domaćih organa, obično se pruža kada se sporne primedbe odnose na pitanje od javnog interesa (videti predmet Morice, naveden gore, stav 125). Kada se pravo na slobodu izražavanja uravnotežuje sa pravom na poštovanje privatnog života, Sud je u svojoj praksi utvrdio niz relevantnih kriterijuma, uključujući da li su sporne izjave doprinele debati od javnog interesa; stepen ozloglašenosti pogođenog lica i temu objavljivanja; kontekst u kome su sporne izjave date; sadržaj, oblik i posledice objavljivanja; prethodno ponašanje dotičnog lica; način na koji su informacije dobijene i njihova istinitost; i prirodu i težinu izrečene kazne (videti, između mnogih drugih izvora, Axel Springer AG protiv Nemačke [VV], broj 39954/08, st. 89–95, od 7. februara 2012. godine).

49. Mora se napraviti razlika između privatnih lica i pojedinaca koji deluju u javnom kontekstu. Shodno tome, dok privatno lice nepoznato javnosti može zahtevati posebnu zaštitu svog prava na privatni život, isto ne važi za javne ličnosti u odnosu na koje su granice kritičkog komentara šire, jer su one neizbežno i svesno izložene javnoj kontroli i stoga moraju pokazati veći stepen tolerancije (videti, između mnogih drugih autoriteta, Milisavljević protiv Srbije, broj 50123/06, stav 34, od 4. aprila 2017. godine).

(ii) Primena gore navedenih načela na ovaj konkretan slučaj

50. U ovom slučaju, podnositeljka je proglašena odgovornom za objavljivanje članka koji je kritikovao postupke javnog funkcionera u vezi sa njegovim javnim izjavama o pitanju od značajnog javnog interesa. Stoga je polje slobodne procene koja se daje državi u ovom kontekstu uska (videti predmet Morice protiv Francuske [VV], broj 29369/10, stav 125, ECLJP 2015).

51. Kritika podnositeljke bila je usmerena protiv N.S.-a, tadašnjeg ministra unutrašnjih poslova i profesionalnog političara u odnosu na koga su granice prihvatljive kritike bile šire nego da je bio samo privatno lice (videti Milisavljević, gore naveden, stav 34). Ulaskom u političku arenu i obavljanjem javne funkcije, on se neizbežno i svesno izložio pažljivoj kontroli – kontroli svake njegove reči i dela od strane novinara i široke javnosti. Štaviše, Sud primećuje da srpski zakon slično nalaže da politički funkcioneri tolerišu stavove koji kritikuju njihove postupke ili politike, čak i kada takvi stavovi mogu biti lično uvredljivi za njih (videti gore navedeni stav 20).

52. Sud takođe mora utvrditi da li su domaći organi postigli pravičnu ravnotežu između dve vrednosti garantovane Konvencijom – slobode izražavanja podnositeljke, zaštićene članom 10, s jedne strane, i prava i interesa N.S.-a prema članu 8, s druge strane; da li su domaći organi primenili kriterijume utvrđene u sudskoj praksi Suda o slobodi izražavanja; i da li su razlozi koje su domaće vlasti navele da bi opravdale mešanje u slobodu izražavanja bili dovoljni i relevantni.

53. U vezi sa tim, Sud primećuje da su izrazi „glup”, „najgluplji” i „nenadmašna i nepredvidiva... glupost”, kako su ih naveli domaći sudovi (videti gore navedene st. 10. i 7, tim redosledom), izvučeni iz različitih delova spornog članka kako bi se zaključilo o nameri podnositeljke da uvredi N.S. Domaći sudovi su kvalifikovali ove izraze kao uvrede, smatrajući da je verovatno da će izazvati duševnu bol kod N.S. i naštetiti njegovom ugledu.

54. Sud dalje napominje da je Viši sud u Beogradu u svojoj prvostepenoj presudi odbacio argument podnositeljke da sporni izrazi predstavljaju vrednosne sudove iznete u kontekstu činjenične situacije od posebnog značaja za srpsko društvo (videti gore navedeni stav 10 in fine). Slično tome, iako je Apelacioni sud priznao da su vrednosni sudovi, u načelu, zaštićeni, utvrdio je da se u slučaju podnositeljke oni ne odnose na pitanje od javnog interesa (videti gore navedeni stav 12 in fine). Međutim, s obzirom na obrazloženje domaćih sudova, Sud nije ubeđen njihovim pristupom i ne deli njihove zaključke. Razmatrajući puni sadržaj članka i objašnjenja podnositeljke pred domaćim sudovima, Sud napominje da novinarska sloboda dozvoljava izvesno preterivanje, provokaciju ili neumerene izjave. Sud smatra da su sporni izrazi mišljenja. Ova mišljenja su izneta provokativno i zajedljivo, koristeći jezik koji bi se mogao smatrati uvredljivim. Međutim, ona su odražavala subjektivnu procenu podnositeljke o postupcima i izjavama N.S.-a, kako je opisano u članku. U ovom kontekstu, Sud se slaže sa podnositeljkom da su sporni izrazi bili vrednosni sudovi, a ne izjave o činjenicama.

55. Štaviše, lično pominjanje N.S.-a nije bilo proizvoljno ili neopravdano, s obzirom na njegov položaj ministra unutrašnjih poslova i njegovu odgovornost za postupanje policije. Dotični članak je bio direktan odgovor na javne izjave samog N.S.-a u vezi sa predmetnim događajima. Kada se posmatraju u kontekstu članka, sporni izrazi su bili zamišljeni kao oštra kritika njegovog odgovora na navodna nasilna rušenja koja su se dogodila u centru Beograda, uključujući „neidentifikovane počinioce koji su nezakonito lišili slobode nekoliko osoba prisutnih u tom području, puštajući ih tek nakon što je rušenje završeno” i „te osobe su potom kontaktirale policiju, koja nije reagovala niti se pojavila na licu mesta” (videti gore navedeni stav 5) – koje predstavlja pitanje od značajnog javnog interesa u kontekstu Srbije. Štaviše, u to vreme je bila u toku intenzivna javna debata o odgovornosti za ova dela i neadekvatnosti reakcije organa za sprovođenje zakona. Izjave podnositeljke su stoga bile deo ovog šireg diskursa o pitanjima od javnog interesa, gde je malo ograničenja prihvatljivo prema članu 10. stav 2. Konvencije (videti, između mnogih drugih izvora, Sürek protiv Turske (br. 1) [VV], broj 26682/95, stav 61, ECLJP 1999-IV). Njihova namera nije bila da „bezobzirno ponize”, odnosno da jednostavno uvrede N.S. Zapravo, podnositeljka je bila dovoljno pažljiva da stavi sporne izraze u kontekst i objasni ih: ona je preduzela razumne mere da jasno obrazloži zašto, po njenom mišljenju, način na koji je policija postupila u predmetnom zločinu i način na koji je N.S. objasnio očigledan nedostatak policijske reakcije zaslužuju tako snažnu reakciju sa njene strane u javnoj debati (videti stav 7 iznad; uporediti sa Skałka protiv Poljske, broj 43425/98, st. 36–37, od 27. maja 2003. godine).

56. Sud primećuje da je u ovom slučaju podnositeljki naređeno da plati približno 2.100 evra zajedno sa još troje tuženih kao naknadu za nematerijalnu štetu i troškove. Međutim, činjenica da je postupak bio građanske, a ne krivične prirode i da je iznos koji je podnositeljki naloženo da plati kao naknadu bio relativno mali ne umanjuje značaj propusta domaćih sudova da zasnuju svoje odluke „na prihvatljivoj proceni relevantnih činjenica” i da navedu „relevantne i dovoljne” razloge (videti, u sličnom smislu, Anatolij Jeremenko protiv Ukrajine, broj 22287/08, st. 106-7, od 15. septembra 2022. godine).

57. Uzimajući u obzir gore navedena razmatranja u celini, Sud smatra da domaći sudovi nisu uspeli da uspostave pravičnu ravnotežu između slobode izražavanja podnositeljke i prava i interesa N.S.-a, da primene standarde koji su u skladu sa načelima sadržanim u članu 10, da se oslone na prihvatljivu procenu relevantnih činjenica i da zasnuju svoje odluke na relevantnim i dovoljnim razlozima. Reakcija nacionalnih organa na članak podnositeljke stoga nije bila neophodna u demokratskom društvu, u smislu člana 10. stav 2. Konvencije.

58. Shodno tome, došlo je do povrede člana 10. Konvencije.

II. NAVODNA POVREDA ČLANA 6. STAV 1. KONVENCIJE

59. Podnositeljka se prituživala da joj je Vrhovni kasacioni sud, odbacivanjem njene revizije, uskratio pristup sudu, kršeći njena prava iz člana 6. stav 1. Konvencije, koji, u relevantnom delu, glasi:

„1. Prilikom odlučivanja o građanskim pravima i obavezama lica... svako ima pravo na pravično ... saslušanje ... od [strane]... tribunala ....”

60. Vlada je tvrdila da je, s obzirom na odluku Ustavnog suda od 11. marta 2024. godine, podnositeljka izgubila status žrtve (videti gore navedeni stav 19).

61. Podnositeljka se nije složila i pozvala je Sud da nastavi sa ispitivanjem njene pritužbe, pozivajući se na svoju dužnost da postupi po članu 37. stav 1. Konvencije ako to zahteva poštovanje ljudskih prava kako je definisano u Konvenciji i njenim protokolima.

62. Sud ponavlja načela koja se tiču gubitka statusa žrtve podnositeljke u smislu Konvencije, rezimirana u gore navedenim st. 28–29.

63. Što se tiče pitanja da li je podnositeljka zaista izgubila status žrtve nakon odluke Ustavnog suda usvojene u njenu korist, Sud napominje sledeće. Prvi uslov, naime priznanje od strane Ustavnog suda da je došlo do povrede prava podnositeljke na pristup sudu, je ispunjen. Što se tiče drugog zahteva, imajući u vidu praksu Suda u sličnim slučajevima, te nalog Ustavnog suda Vrhovnom sudu da ponovo razmotri slučaj podnositeljke, ona više ne može tvrditi da je žrtva navodne povrede (videti, između ostalog, Ložkin protiv Rusije (odluka) broj 16384/08, od 22. oktobra 2013. godine). Ovo posebno s obzirom na to da podnositeljka nije tražila nikakvu nadoknadu za ovu navodnu povredu pred Sudom (videti stav 66 ispod). Na kraju, u vezi sa zahtevom podnositeljke da Sud nastavi svoje ispitivanje iz poštovanja prema ljudskim pravima, Sud odbija ovaj zahtev, napominjući da se ovaj zahtev odnosi samo na pitanje da li je podnositeljka pretrpela značajnu štetu, a ne na utvrđivanje statusa žrtve (videti relevantna načela navedena u stavu 34 iznad).

64. Iz toga sledi da je pritužba podnositeljke u vezi sa njenim pristupom sudu na osnovu člana 6. Konvencije nespojiva ratione personae sa odredbama Konvencije u smislu člana 35. stav 3(a) i da se mora odbaciti u skladu sa članom 35. stav 4.

III. PRIMENA ČLANA 41. KONVENCIJE

65. Član 41. Konvencije glasi:

„Kada Sud utvrdi kršenje Konvencije ili protokola uz nju, a unutrašnje pravo Visoke strane ugovornice u pitanju omogućava samo delimičnu odštetu, Sud će, ako je to potrebno, pružiti pravično zadovoljenje oštećenoj strani.”

66. Podnositeljka nije podnela zahtev za pravičnu naknadu. Shodno tome, Sud smatra da nema razloga da joj se dodeli bilo koji iznos na tom osnovu.

IZ OVIH RAZLOGA, SUD, JEDNOGLASNO,

1. Proglašava pritužbu u vezi sa članom 10. Konvencije prihvatljivom, a ostatak predstavke neprihvatljivom;

2. Smatra da je došlo do povrede člana 10. Konvencije.

Sastavljeno na engleskom jeziku i prosleđeno u pisanom obliku 13. januara 2025. godine, u skladu s pravilom 77. st. 2. i 3. Poslovnika o radu Suda.

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF PEŠIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 4545/21)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
13 January 2026

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Pešić v. Serbia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Ioannis Ktistakis, President,

Lətif Hüseynov,

Darian Pavli,

Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,

Mateja Đurović,

Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,

Vasilka Sancin, judges,

and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 4545/21) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Serbian national, Ms Vesna Pešić (“the applicant”), on 15 December 2020;

the decision to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the applicant’s freedom of expression, her access to a court and the fairness of civil proceedings under Article 6 § 1 and Article 10 of the Convention;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 25 November 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The application concerns the applicant’s freedom of expression under Article 10 and her right of access to a court under Article 6 of the Convention. She alleged that the damages awarded against her in civil proceedings initiated by a public official constituted an unjustified interference with her Article 10 rights. Furthermore, she submitted that the civil proceedings had been unfair, as she had not been permitted to put certain questions to the plaintiff, and that the subsequent judgment of the Constitutional Court was “inadequately reasoned”. Lastly, the applicant claimed that the Serbian Supreme Court of Cassation’s refusal to consider her appeal on points of law (revizija) had been in breach of her Article 6 right of access to a court.

THE FACTS

2. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Belgrade. She was represented by Ms K. Kostić, a lawyer practising in the same city.

3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar.

4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

I. THE RELEVANT CONTEXT

5. In the early hours of 25 April 2016, as part of a construction project, numerous structures in central Belgrade were demolished using heavy machinery. During the operation, unidentified perpetrators unlawfully detained several individuals present in the area, releasing them only after the demolition was complete. These individuals subsequently contacted the police, who failed to respond or attend the scene. The investigation into these events appears to be ongoing.

6. On 12 May 2016 the then Minister of the Interior in the Serbian Government, N.S., made a public statement addressing the events in question. Among other remarks, he stated as follows:

“However, when it comes to endangering the lives of police officers – for instance, when electrical cables have been cut – the police will not intervene or enter the area until the threat to their safety has been neutralised.”

II. THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED BY THE APPLICANT

7. On 13 May 2016 the applicant, a former politician and long-time political activist, published an article headed “Adding Salt (Dosoljavanje)” on the website of the citizens’ association “Peščanik” to which she was a regular contributor. The relevant part of the article reads as follows:

“... Alright, everything has been exposed. The only thing that remains unsurpassed and unpredictable is the stupidity of the Minister of the Interior, [N.S.]. So far, we haven’t figured out why exactly he was given the role of playing the fool (da ispadne najgluplji). Perhaps it’s because he always shows up after Vučić to “plug” the remaining holes. And what gems did he come up with this time? He declared that the fact that the main news item in Serbia is the demolition of three illegal buildings in Savamala is just ‘spin’. Just three buildings? Yet we saw the pile of rubble that bulldozers were clearing away for days and the demolition lasted all night. The Minister wisely added that demolitions like this should not happen in such a manner, but even when they do, they certainly shouldn’t be the biggest news story in Serbia. Perhaps they should be sidelined, or maybe not even reported on at all, despite the fact that masked men illegally demolished the city centre at night, committing a slew of criminal acts. That was quite a stupid statement (mnogo glupo), but what followed was the most stupid (najgluplje). When asked by a journalist why the police hadn’t responded when the desperate guards and property owners in Savamala had informed them of what was happening, he said that the police couldn’t act because it wasn’t permitted to endanger the lives of officers! The Minister explained that they could have been electrocuted by live wires from the demolished buildings. And so, we’ve ended up with a situation where the police exist to protect themselves! As for the citizens, well, whatever fate has in store for them. Let them be electrocuted. In fact, they probably deserve it. The Minister explained that these were citizens whose buildings served for ‘acquiring wealth’, that they were ‘structures created through collusion between politics and tycoons’.

...

And finally, the Minister’s promise that everything will be investigated. We’ll investigate this too. The investigation will reveal everything. As long as the electricity is turned off. And if we stop spinning this story about how the demolition is such an important issue. But it has turned out to be very important, because this thuggish disregard for the law, citizens’ rights and the destruction of the city has become intolerable.”

III. THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

8. On 27 July 2016 the Minister of the Interior, N.S., brought a civil suit against the applicant, the association “Peščanik” and its editors-in-chief, S.L. and S.V., before the Belgrade High Court (Viši sud u Beogradu – “the High Court”), seeking 200,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The claim was based on the alleged mental distress caused by an attack on his honour and reputation.

9. On 27 April 2018 the High Court held a hearing where both N.S., as plaintiff, and the applicant, as defendant, gave testimony. During the proceedings, the applicant addressed issues relating to the Minister’s political accountability, statements made by the then Prime Minister regarding opposition parties and one of the ruling parties, of which N.S. was a member. Twice, the judge directed the applicant to confine her statements to matters pertinent to the case and to avoid making political speeches during the hearing. The High Court also disallowed certain questions posed to N.S. as irrelevant.

10. On 10 July 2018 the High Court delivered a judgment in favour of N.S., granting his claim. In its reasoning, it found that the applicant’s remarks regarding N.S.’s “stupidity” exceeded the permissible bounds of acceptable criticism of N.S.’s statements and actions, amounting to a personal insult. It determined that the applicant had maliciously and inaccurately represented N.S.’s statement. The High Court held that the text in question neither contributed to public discourse about the event nor sought to address the issue at hand. Instead, it was aimed at denigrating N.S., subjectively categorising him and attacking his dignity, reputation, and honour, thereby causing him mental distress. While the applicant argued that the expressions used were her value judgments based on the factual context of the violent demolitions in the Savamala neighbourhood in Belgrade, the High Court dismissed these claims as baseless and an attempt to evade accountability. Accordingly, on the basis of Article 200 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 23 below), the court ordered the defendants, jointly, to pay N.S. RSD 200,000 (approximately 1,710 euros (EUR) at that time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and RSD 95,100 (approximately EUR 810) for costs and expenses, plus interest.

11. The applicant appealed against the judgment relying, in particular, on Article 10 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law. Separately, the association “Peščanik”, together with S.L. and S.V., lodged their own appeal.

12. On 17 October 2018 the Belgrade Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud – “the Court of Appeal”) rejected both appeals and varied the judgment of the High Court, reducing the damages awarded to N.S. to RSD 150,000 (approximately EUR 1,280) and his compensation for costs and expenses to RSD 93,100 (approximately EUR 800). In its reasoning, the Court of Appeal emphasised that “not all manners of conveying ideas and opinions fall within the scope of freedom of expression, as freedom of expression cannot contradict its own purpose”. It further noted that the applicant’s article had not contributed to public debate on the matter in question or sought to address a particular issue; rather, its intent appeared to have been solely to offend N.S. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that while value judgments were generally permitted, value judgments that were defamatory in nature and were not in the public interest were impermissible.

13. On 5 December 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation (Vrhovni kasacioni sud). Separately, the association “Peščanik”, along with S.L. and S.V., lodged their own appeal on points of law.

14. On 20 December 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) against the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on 17 October 2018 (see paragraph 12 above). Separately, the association “Peščanik”, together with S.L. and S.V., also lodged their own constitutional appeal against the same judgment.

15. On 21 March 2019 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed both appeals on points of law (see paragraph 13 above). In its reasoning the Supreme Court of Cassation underscored that the applicant, the association “Peščanik”, S.L. and S.V. lacked standing to lodge an appeal on points of law, as such an appeal was only permissible on the part of the party whose rights had been “diminished or withheld” by a second-instance judgment. Since the Court of Appeal had reduced the damages awarded to N.S., only N.S. himself could have lodged an appeal on points of law against it (see paragraph 12 above).

16. On 8 August 2019 the applicant lodged an additional appeal with the Constitutional Court claiming, in particular, that the Supreme Court of Cassation’s dismissal of her appeal on points of law had infringed her right of access to a court. The applicant requested that this constitutional appeal be joined with her earlier appeal of 20 December 2018 (see paragraph 14 above).

17. On 9 August 2019, the association “Peščanik”, S.L. and S.V. lodged their own constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court of Cassation’s ruling of 21 March 2019.

18. On 4 June 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals lodged by the applicant on 20 December 2018 and 8 August 2019 (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above). With regard specifically to the complaint concerning freedom of expression, it found that the complaint did not present valid constitutional arguments but rather sought a reassessment of the legality of the judgments appealed against, which was beyond its jurisdiction as a constitutional body. The Constitutional Court also agreed with the Supreme Court of Cassation’s finding that the applicant did not have standing to lodge an appeal on points of law. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 16 June 2020.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE COMMUNICATION OF THE APPLICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT

19. On 19 March 2024, after the application in the present case had been communicated to the Government, the applicant informed the Court that the Constitutional Court had delivered a decision (Už-8174/2019) on 11 March 2024, dealing with the constitutional appeal lodged by the association “Peščanik”, S.L., and S.V. on 9 August 2019 (see paragraph 17 above). In the decision, the Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court of Cassation (having since been renamed as the Supreme Court on 11 May 2023) had infringed the appellants’ right to a fair trial in dismissing their appeal on points of law (see paragraph 15 above). The Constitutional Court thus quashed the Supreme Court of Cassation’s decision of 21 March 2019 and instructed the Supreme Court to re-examine the appeal on points of law in question. Moreover, the Constitutional Court clarified that its decision applied equally to the applicant personally, since she was “in the same legal situation as the appellants”. To date, the Court has not been notified by the parties about the outcome of the new proceedings before the Supreme Court (25 November 2005).

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. THE PUBLIC INFORMATION AND MEDIA ACT (ZAKON O JAVNOM INFORMISANJU I MEDIJIMA, PUBLISHED IN OG RS NOS. 83/2014, 58/2015 AND 12/2016 – AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION)

20. At the material time, Article 8 of the Public Information and Media Act provided, inter alia, that elected, appointed, or designated public or political officeholders had to tolerate the expression of views critical of their actions in the discharge of their office or the policies they implemented in their role, regardless of any personal offence they might take at such views.

II. THE OBLIGATIONS ACT (ZAKON O OBLIGACIONIM ODNOSIMA; PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA NOS. 29/1978, 39/1985, 45/1989 AND 57/1989, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA NO. 31/1993 AND OG RS NO. 18/2020)

21. Article 154 of this Act sets out the various grounds on which compensation may be claimed.

22. Article 199 provides that, in the event of an infringement of personal rights, the courts may order that their judgments be published or that a publication be rectified, or order the person who caused the damage to retract the statements which caused the infringement.

23. Article 200 provides, in particular, that anyone who has suffered fear, physical pain or mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of his or her right to reputation, personal integrity, liberty or other personal rights (prava ličnosti) is entitled to seek financial compensation in the civil courts and, in addition, to request such other forms of redress “as may be capable” of affording adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.

THE LAW

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

24. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention that the civil proceedings which had been brought against her and the resulting damages she had been ordered to pay had been in breach of her right to freedom of expression. The applicant further complained that the impugned civil proceedings had been unfair owing to: (a) the restrictions which had been imposed on her while giving her testimony in court and (b) the lack of proper reasoning in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 4 June 2020.

25. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see, for example, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court considers that the above complaints all fall to be examined under Article 10 of the Convention alone (see, mutatis mutandis, Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 15028/16, § 31-32, 27 August 2024).

26. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others...”

A. Admissibility

1. Whether the applicant has victim status

27. The Government submitted that the applicant had lost her victim status on the ground that the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 11 March 2024, had explicitly acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Cassation had infringed the applicant’s right to a fair trial by dismissing her appeal on points of law (see paragraph 19 above).

28. The applicant contested the Government’s submissions, arguing that she still had victim status, notwithstanding the Constitutional Court’s decision.

29. The Court reiterates that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any violation of the Convention and that in assessing whether an applicant can claim to be a genuine victim of an alleged violation, account should be taken not only of the formal position at the time when the application was lodged with the Court but of all the circumstances of the case in question, including any developments prior to the date of the examination of the case by the Court (see Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 105, ECHR 2010).

30. A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 259, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).

31. Having regard to the above, and in particular to the question of “acknowledgment”, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court did not, even in substance, find a violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention in the applicant’s case. It therefore considers that the applicant’s victim status in relation to her complaints under that provision cannot be called into question and rejects the objection raised by the Government in this connection.

2. Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage

32. The Government further submitted that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. They noted that, pursuant to the High Court’s judgment of 10 July 2018, the applicant was ordered to pay, jointly with S.L., S.V. and the association “Peščanik”, a total sum of RSD 243,000, equivalent to approximately EUR 2,000 (EUR) at the material time. The Government added that the applicant’s individual share of the awarded damages, amounting to roughly EUR 500, should be regarded as insignificant.

33. The applicant acknowledged that she had not suffered a significant financial disadvantage. However, she argued that respect for human rights necessitated an examination of the complaint on the merits. In her view, it was essential to send a clear message to judicial and administrative authorities in Serbia that freedom of expression encompasses the right to use strong language when criticising high-ranking state officials. She emphasised that the protection of such officials’ honour should not take precedence over freedom of expression, particularly in the context of political discourse in the media.

34. The criterion of no significant disadvantage hinges on the idea that a breach of a Convention right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by the Court. The assessment of this minimum is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, and the severity of a breach should be gauged taking account of both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what was objectively at stake. However, even if it is found that the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage as a result of the matter complained of, the complaint may nonetheless not be declared inadmissible on this ground if respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, requires an examination on the merits (see, as a recent authority, X and others v. Ireland, nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, § 63, 22 June 2023).

35. The Court has also held that, in cases concerning freedom of expression, the application of the admissibility criterion contained in Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention should take due account of the importance of this freedom (see Gachechiladze v. Georgia, no. 2591/19, § 40, 22 July 2021) and be subject to the Court’s own careful scrutiny. This scrutiny should encompass, among other things, such elements as contribution to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media (see, for example, Sylka v. Poland (dec.), no. 19219/07, § 28, 3 June 2014, with further references).

36. Applying these principles to the present case, the Court notes that the issue at hand was clearly of significant subjective importance to the applicant, who viewed the alleged violation as raising a question of principle. Specifically, the civil proceedings, in her view, were closely linked to her fundamental right to criticise the actions of high-ranking public officials through the media. As to what was objectively at stake, the applicant’s role as a regular opinion writer for the association “Peščanik” website underscores the broader context of the alleged violation. The interference must therefore be assessed in the light of the essential role a free press plays in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (see Falzon v. Malta, no. 45791/13, § 57, 20 March 2018, concerning factual circumstances very similar to those in the present case as regards the status of the applicant as an opinion writer in particular). Accordingly, the alleged breach of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case indeed raises an “important question of principle”. The Court is thus satisfied that it cannot be said that the applicant suffered no significant disadvantage as a result of the civil proceedings, regardless of the relatively insubstantial pecuniary consequences for her referred to by the Government. Hence, the Court does not deem it necessary to consider whether respect for human rights would compel it to examine the case or whether it was duly considered by a domestic tribunal (see, mutatis mutandis, M.N. and Others v. San Marino, no. 28005/12, § 39, 7 July 2015).

37. Accordingly, the Government’s objection in this context must be rejected.

3. Conclusion

38. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

39. The applicant contended that the order to pay damages, issued by the High Court on account of the publication of her allegedly insulting article, constituted a clear interference with her freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. She argued that the High Court should have based its decision on the protections afforded to journalists under the Public Information and Media Act rather than applying the liability provisions of the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 20-23 above). While acknowledging that the judgment had pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the rights of others, the applicant submitted that the damages imposed had nevertheless been disproportionate. In particular, she argued that the domestic courts had also failed to strike the proper balance between her right to freely express an opinion and N.S.’s right to protect his dignity as a public official who, by virtue of his position, should have been expected to tolerate criticism of his professional conduct, even if he perceived it as personally insulting.

40. The applicant further submitted that her criticism of N.S.’s actions had been motivated by the information available at the time, which had led her to believe that his explanation – that the police had failed to act owing to the presence of high-voltage cables – was merely a fabricated justification. Lastly, the applicant submitted that she had found N.S.’s explanation of why the police had failed to do their duty so unconvincing that it had given her the impression that he had in fact simultaneously underestimated the intelligence of the Serbian public and, in so doing, displayed his own lack of judgment.

(b) The Government

41. The Government did not contest that the judgment in question had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. This interference was, however, lawful under the Obligations Act and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting N.S.’s reputation. They further submitted that the interference had been proportionate to that aim, emphasising that the damages awarded against the applicant had been the result of civil proceedings, not criminal prosecution, and that the amount awarded had not been excessive.

42. The Government added that the applicant’s article had not made a substantive contribution to the public debate on the issue in question and that there had to be reasonable limits to N.S.’s own tolerance for criticism, which the applicant had exceeded in this instance. They argued that the applicant was herself a well-known public figure, which distinguished her position from that of a private individual or journalist, and that she did not merit the same level of protection. The online publication of the article had amplified its reach and had therefore had more serious consequences for N.S.’s private life. Finally, the applicant’s choice of language – terms such as “stupid”, “most stupid”, and “unsurpassed and unpredictable ... stupidity” – amounted to ad hominem insults rather than legitimate criticism.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Existence of an interference

43. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment by which the applicant was ordered to pay damages in civil proceedings amounted to an “interference by [a] public authority” with her right to freedom of expression. Such interference will infringe the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It must therefore be determined whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve the relevant aim or aims.

(b) Whether the interference was prescribed by law

44. The Court notes that, in ordering the applicant to pay damages to N.S., the domestic courts relied on the general provisions on liability contained in the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 21-23 above). It concludes, therefore, that the interference at issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

(c) Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim

45. The Court notes that it is not disputed between the parties that the interference pursued one of the aims listed in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely the “protection of the reputation or rights of others” and sees no reason for it to hold otherwise.

(d) Whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”

(i) General principles

46. The general principles for assessing the necessity of an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression are set out in, among other authorities, Morice, cited above, § 124, ECHR 2015); Bédat v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 56925/08, §§ 48-54, 29 March 2016); Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina ([GC], no. 17224/11, § 75, 27 June 2017); and SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal (no. 29856/13, §§ 54-62, 27 July 2021).

47. In order to fulfil its positive obligation to safeguard one person’s rights under Article 8, the State may have to restrict to some extent the rights secured under Article 10 for another person. When examining the necessity of that restriction in a democratic society in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, the Court may be required to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 and, on the other, the right to respect for private life as enshrined in Article 8 (see Bédat, § 74, and Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others, § 77, both cited above, with further references).

48. The Court has held that the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity and scope of any interference with the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention. A high level of protection of freedom of expression, with the national authorities thus having a particularly narrow margin of appreciation, will normally be accorded where the impugned remarks concern a matter of public interest (see Morice, cited above, § 125). Where the right to freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for private life, the Court has laid down a number of relevant criteria in its case-law, including whether the impugned statements contributed to a debate of public interest; the degree of notoriety of the person affected and the subject of the publication; the context within which the impugned statements were made; the content, form and consequences of the publication; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity; and the nature and severity of the penalty imposed (see, among many other authorities, Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 89-95, 7 February 2012).

49. A distinction must be made between private individuals and individuals acting in a public context. Accordingly, whilst a private individual unknown to the public may claim particular protection of his or her right to private life, the same is not true of public figures in respect of whom limits of critical comment are wider, as they are inevitably and knowingly exposed to public scrutiny and must therefore display a greater degree of tolerance (see, among many other authorities, Milisavljević v. Serbia, no. 50123/06, § 34, 4 April 2017).

(ii) Application of the above principles to the present case

50. In the present case, the applicant was held liable for publishing an article that criticised the actions of a public official in connection with his public statements on a matter of significant public interest. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State in the present context is therefore a narrow one (see Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § 125, ECHR 2015).

51. The applicant’s criticism was directed against N.S., the then Minister of the Interior and a professional politician in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism were wider than if he had been merely a private individual (see Milisavljević, cited above, § 34). By entering the political arena and holding public office, he inevitably and knowingly laid himself open to close scrutiny – scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large. Furthermore, the Court observes that Serbian law similarly mandates that political officeholders tolerate views critical of their actions or policies, even when such views may be personally offensive to them (see paragraph 20 above).

52. The Court must furthermore ascertain whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between the two values guaranteed by the Convention – the applicant’s freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10, on the one hand, and N.S.’s rights and interests under Article 8 on the other; whether the domestic authorities applied the criteria established in the Court’s case-law on freedom of expression; and whether the reasons given by the domestic authorities to justify the interference with freedom of expression were sufficient and relevant.

53. In this connection, the Court observes that the expressions “stupid”, “most stupid” and “unsurpassed and unpredictable ... stupidity”, as cited by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 10 and 7 above, in that order), were drawn from various parts of the impugned article to infer the applicant’s intent to insult N.S. The domestic courts classified these expressions as insults, deeming them likely to cause N.S. emotional distress and to harm his reputation.

54. The Court further notes that, in its first-instance judgment, the Belgrade High Court rejected the applicant’s argument that the expressions in question constituted value judgments made in the context of a factual situation of particular importance to Serbian society (see paragraph 10 in fine above). Similarly, while the Court of Appeal acknowledged that value judgments were, in principle, protected, it held that, in the applicant’s case, they did not relate to a matter of public interest (see paragraph 12 in fine above). However, in view of the domestic courts’ reasoning, the Court is not persuaded by their approach and does not share their conclusions. Considering the full content of the article and the applicant’s explanations before the domestic courts, the Court notes that journalistic freedom allows for some exaggeration, provocation, or immoderate statements. The Court considers the expressions in question to be opinions. These opinions were voiced provocatively and caustically, using language that could be seen as insulting. However, they reflected the applicant’s subjective assessment of N.S.’s actions and statements, as described in the article. In this context, the Court agrees with the applicant that the disputed expressions were value judgments rather than statements of fact.

55. Moreover, the personal reference to N.S. was not arbitrary or gratuitous, given his position as Minister of the Interior and his responsibility for the conduct of the police. The article in question was a direct response to N.S.’s own public statements regarding the events in question. When viewed in the context of the article, the impugned expressions were intended as a harsh critique of his response to alleged violent demolitions that had taken place in the centre of Belgrade, including the “unidentified perpetrators unlawfully detaining several individuals present in the area, releasing them only after the demolition was complete” and “these individuals subsequently contacting the police, who failed to respond or attend the scene” (see paragraph 5 above) – an issue of significant public interest in the Serbian context. Moreover, at the time, an intense public debate was underway concerning both accountability for these acts and the inadequacy of the response by law enforcement authorities. The applicant’s statements were therefore a part of this broader discourse on matters of public concern, where few restrictions are acceptable under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV). They were not intended to “wantonly denigrate”, that is to simply insult N.S. In fact, the applicant was careful enough to put the impugned expressions into context and explain them: she took reasonable care to articulate clearly why, in her view, the way the police had handled the crime in question and the way in which N.S. had explained the apparent lack of police reaction deserved such a strong reaction from her side in the public debate (see paragraph 7 above; contrast Skałka v. Poland, no. 43425/98, §§ 36-37, 27 May 2003).

56. The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicant was ordered to pay approximately EUR 2,100 jointly with three other defendants as compensation for non-pecuniary damage and costs. However, the fact that the proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature and that the amount the applicant was ordered to pay in compensation was relatively small does not diminish the importance of the domestic courts’ failure to base their decisions “on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts” and to adduce “relevant and sufficient” reasons (see, to similar effect, Anatoliy Yeremenko v. Ukraine, no. 22287/08, §§ 106-7, 15 September 2022).

57. Having regard to the above considerations as a whole, the Court considers that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s freedom of expression and N.S.’s rights and interests, to apply standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10, to rely on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts and to base their decisions on relevant and sufficient reasons. The national authorities’ reaction to the applicant’s article was therefore not necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

58. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

59. The applicant complained that by dismissing her appeal on points of law the Supreme Court of Cassation had denied her access to a court, in breach of her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal....”

60. The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 11 March 2024 the applicant has lost her victim status (see paragraph 19 above).

61. The applicant disagreed and urged the Court to pursue the examination of her complaint, citing its duty to proceed under Article 37 § 1 of the Convention if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols so requires.

62. The Court reiterates the principles concerning the loss of an applicant’s victim status within the meaning of the Convention, summarised in paragraphs 28-29 above.

63. As to whether the applicant has in fact lost her victim status following the Constitutional Court’s decision rendered in her favour, the Court notes as follows. The first requirement, namely the acknowledgment, by the Constitutional Court, of a violation of the applicant’s right of access to a court has been fulfilled. As to the second requirement, having regard to the Court’s practice in similar cases, the Constitutional Court’s instruction to the Supreme Court to re-hear the applicant’s case amounts to sufficient redress, such that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation (see, among other authorities, Lozhkin v. Russia (dec.) no. 16384/08, 22 October 2013). This is particularly so, given that the applicant did not claim any damages for this alleged violation before the Court (see paragraph 66 below). Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s request that the Court pursue its examination out of respect for human rights, the Court rejects this request, noting that this requirement pertains only to the question whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage, not to the determination of victim status (see the relevant principles set out in paragraph 34 above).

64. It follows that the applicant’s complaint regarding her access to a court under Article 6 of the Convention is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

65. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

66. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.